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 1 
Summary 
Cultivation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has for a long time been a disputed and 
politically sensitive topic in the EU. To many European citizens such cultivation raises concerns, 
ranging from safety and socioeconomic questions to ethical issues.  This thesis examines the 
possibilities for Member States to respond to such concerns by imposing national GM cultivation 
restrictions. 
 
This in an area of regulation that is part of a larger internal market context. The EU legal framework 
on GMOs has since it was put into place been characterised by a high degree of harmonisation and 
centralisation. Following this, a GMO that has been authorised for cultivation purposes may in 
principle be cultivated throughout the entire Union. National restriction after such authorisation has 
been granted has in large been limited to explicit derogation provisions in secondary and primary 
EU law. Until recently, these mainly science-based provisions have mostly provided for health and 
environmental concerns to be invoked by Member States. In 2015, the possibilities for Member 
States to limit GM cultivation were amended by partial “de-harmonisation” of the GMO 
framework. 
 
The article enshrined in the amendment also comes with some innovative procedural changes. It 
holds that before authorisation Member States can reach agreements with the economic operators 
applying for authorisation on restricting the geographical scope of where the GMO can be 
cultivated. On paper the mentioned de-harmonisation means that where such agreements are not 
reached, a wide range of concerns can form the basis for Member State restrictions after 
authorisation,  if the measures in question are in conformity with Union law.  
 
In the thesis the scope for Member States to “opt out” of GM cultivation under the original still-
existing provisions and the amendment are put under scrutiny.  
 
By looking back at their historical use, the examination shows that the central institutions such as 
the Commission and the EU Courts have interpreted the substantive conditions of the original 
provisions strictly. As such Member States have been unsuccessful in fulfilling their substantive 
conditions, which in theory makes environmental considerations hard to pursue under them. 
However, much to the dismay of the Commission, procedural rules have often allowed Member 
States to keep their national restrictions. In other cases, the Commission itself has had a rather lax 
approach to restricting measures, making restrictions possible.  
 
Regarding the amendment, it is found that many questions arise as to its actual scope and how it 
changes the overall possibilities to adopt restrictions. First, there is no guarantee that Member States 
will succeed in negotiations with companies seeking authorisation. Second, the partial de-
harmonisation comes along with questions as to if this at all changes the possibilities to invoke 
environmental concerns. Moreover, requirements on the restrictive measures’ compliance with 
general rules and principles of internal market law could limit the scope of the new article. A 
number of potential hurdles are identified in light of the case law on free movement provisions. In 
this regard, the future of restricting GM cultivation by relying on the new derogation grounds will 
depend on the approach taken by the Commission and the EU courts to the new article. 
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Sammanfattning 
Odling av genetiskt modifierade organismer (GMO) har länge varit ett omdebatterat och politiskt 
känsligt ämne i EU. Sådan odling väcker en mängd olika betänksamheter och frågor hos europeiska 
medborgare. I spektrumet återfinns bland annat frågor om risker för miljön och hälsa till 
socioekonomiska och etiska betänkligheter.  Den här uppsatsen undersöker medlemstaters 
möjligheter att svara upp mot sådana betänkligheter genom att införa nationella begränsningar mot 
odling av GM grödor. 
 
Det EU-rättsliga ramverket för GMO har sedan dess tillkomst kännetecknats av en hög grad av 
harmonisering och centralisering. På detta följer att en GMO som har beviljats odlingstillstånd via 
regelverkets tillståndsförfarande i princip kan odlas i hela Unionen. Utrymmet för nationella 
begränsningar efter beviljat tillstånd har i stort sett varit begränsat till explicita 
undantagsbestämmelser i EU:s primär- och sekundärrätt. Fram tills nyligen har dessa 
undantagsregler främst bestått av vetenskapsinriktade sådana, vilka föreskriver att miljö- och 
hälsobetänkligheter kan åberopas.  2015 kom GMO- ramverket att delvis revideras genom en 
partiell ”av-harmonisering” av medlemsstaters möjligheter att begränsa av odling.  
 
Artikeln som återfinns i tilläggsdirektivet innehåller även en innovativ processuell förändring. Den 
innebär att medlemsstater kan ingå överenskommelser med företag som söker odlingsstillstånd 
under tillståndsprocessen så att det geografiska området där odling får ske begränsas. På pappret 
innebär den ovan nämnda av-harmoniseringen att i de fall där sådana överenskommelser inte kan 
nås så kan medlemsstaterna nu åberopa en mängd nya grunder till stöd för restriktiva åtgärder efter 
beviljat odlingstillstånd. Detta förutsätter dock att åtgärderna står i överensstämmelse med 
unionsrätten. I uppsatsen utreds utrymmet under de ursprungliga, ännu gällande bestämmelserna 
och tilläggsdirektivet för medlemsstaterna att begränsa odling av GM grödor.  
 
Genom en granskning av rättspraxis och det tidigare bruket av de ursprungliga bestämmelserna 
framgår i uppsatsen att centrala institutioner, såsom Kommissionen och EU-domstolarna har tolkat 
dessas materiella rekvisit restriktivt. Medlemsstaterna har genomgående misslyckats med att bevisa 
att kraven är uppfyllda, vilket i teorin gör att miljömässiga betänkligheter juridiskt sett är svåra att 
framföra under dessa bestämmelser. Till Kommissionens förtret har dock processuella regler i 
många fall möjliggjort att medlemsstater kunnat behålla sina nationella odlingsbegränsande 
bestämmelser.  I andra fall har Kommissionen själv visat på en relativt återhållsam inställning till 
restriktiva åtgärder, vilket har möjliggjort för deras införande och bibehållande.  
 
Gällande artikeln i tilläggsdirektivet finner uppsatsen att en mängd frågor uppenbarar sig rörande 
vilket utrymme den faktiskt ger medlemsstaterna och hur den ändrar de övergripande möjligheterna 
att införa nationella begränsningar.  Till att börja med finns det ingen garanti att medlemsstaterna 
lyckas i förhandlingarna med tillståndssökare. För det andra medför den partiella av-
harmoniseringen frågor gällande om den alls ändrar möjligheterna att åberopa miljöskäl. Därtill 
innebär krav på de restriktiva åtgärdernas förenlighet med generella regler och principer för inre 
marknaden att utrymmet i praktiken kan komma att vara begränsat. Flera potentiella hinder 
identifieras i ljuset av rättspraxis gällande reglerna för fri rörlighet. I detta avseende kommer 
eventuell framgång vid åberopande av de nya grunderna som stöd för begränsning av GM odling i 
stor utsträckning bero på Kommissionens och EU-domstolarnas förhållningssätt till den nya 
artikeln. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Introduction 
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have been controversial ever since the birth of genetic 
engineering. Debates on the benefits and concerns of GMOs range from questions of their safety to 
their socioeconomic and ethical implications.1  Positions on these issues differ widely within and 
between given political entities. Regulation of GMOs is “deeply embedded in its social context”2 
and there are a number of interests and concerns for decision-makers to take account of. 
 
Whereas genetic engineering applies to different areas, history shows that one of the most heated 
aspects of this modern technique is the cultivation of GM crops.3 Since such cultivation first 
became commercialised in the USA in the mid 1990s, the total global area covered by GM 
agriculture has now passed 180 million hectares, or 1,8 million km2. As for now, commercial 
cultivation of a wide array of GM crops takes place in some twenty countries.4  
 
Within the EU only one GM crop is currently authorised to be commercially cultivated. That is the 
MON810, a variety of GM maize that has been modified to protect it from the European corn 
borer.5  Today, commercial cultivation of MON810 takes place in five Member States on a total area 
of 1430 km2.6  
 
As these modest numbers suggest, GM agriculture has not been uncontroversial in the Union. On 
the contrary, many Member States have been sceptical towards it. Out of 27 Member States, only 
eight have experienced commercial transgenic agriculture.7 GM cultivation is an emotive issue to 
many EU citizens and has met strong public opposition in many Member States.8 With various 
stakeholders, such as the biotechnology industry, farmers’ organisations and environmental groups 
also making themselves heard, GM cultivation is and has for a long time been a politically sensitive 
issue in the EU. The economic importance of GMOs, the social controversies surrounding them, as 
well as the high levels of uncertainty as to their long-term effects, have all contributed to various 
political and regulatory troubles.9 Indeed, the functioning of the EU legal framework on GMOs has 
since it was put in place been troubled by political disagreement. This has resulted in deadlocks in 
decision-making and significant delays in the process of authorisation of GM products on the 
internal market of the EU.10  
                                                 
1 See chapter 2.1. 
2 Lee 2008, p. 19. 
3 Especially so in the EU. Dobbs 2011, p. 180; Lee 2014, p. 235f. 
4 The top five countries are the USA, Brazil, Argentina, India and Canada. The most common GM crops are soybean, 
cotton, maize and canola. ISAAA, Brief 49-2014: Top Ten Facts:  
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/49/toptenfacts/default.asp 
5 This is an insect native to Europe that is a pest of grain, particularly maize.  
6 Spain, Czech Republic, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia. The vast majority, 1315 km2, is cultivated in Spain.  In 
addition field trials takes place in many Member States. ISAAA, Brief 49-2014: Top Ten Facts:  
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/49/ toptenfacts/default.asp 
7 See Poli 2013, p. 143, who holds that Member States wishing to cultivate GMOs have always been a minority. 
8 As an illustrative example, between 2000 and 2010 there were over 70 serious attacks of vandalism on GM 
experimental field trials across the EU. This resulted in experimental trials of GM crops being relocated outside the EU.  
Morris and Spillane 2010, p. 363. 
9 Zurek 2011, p. 241.  
10 Weimer 2010, p. 345. See chapter 2.2. 
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As such, regulation of - and Member States’ ability to respond to public concerns regarding – GM 
cultivation is largely set within the context of the internal market, which to a large extent provides a 
backdrop and limits to the extent that Member States can pursue individual polices.11 In that context 
lays the GMO framework. At its core is a centralised authorisation system with case-by-case risk 
assessments, where an approval is needed for cultivation of each individual GMO. Overall, this 
framework is characterised by a high degree of harmonisation, where a GM crop that has been 
authorised in principle can be cultivated throughout the entire Union.12  Also following the 
harmonised nature of the legal framework, the Member States have historically been afforded a 
rather limited discretion to regulate GM cultivation within their territories.13 Yet, a number of 
Member States14 have introduced national measures to restrict or prohibit GM cultivation. The 
Commission15 have considered many of these bans unlawful, still, most of them have been kept. 
 
Drawing on this, the subject of this thesis is to examine Member States’ legal and practical 
possibilities to adopt such restrictive measures in response to their citizens’ concerns. Following 
years of negotiations within and between the legislative institutions, these possibilities were 
amended as late as this spring by partially de-harmonising the GMO framework.  
 
1.2 Aim and research questions 
The overarching purpose of the thesis is to examine the legal possibilities for EU Member States to 
restrict cultivation of GM crops within their territories. In doing so, some additional focus is given 
to the substantive requirements regarding what concerns that are deemed legally legitimate for 
Member States to invoke when introducing restrictive measures. However, a complete picture of 
Member States’ possibilities to opt out16 from GM cultivation also requires an understanding of the 
actors17 that shape these legitimate concerns and the processes through which they do so. Put 
differently, procedural rules are key to fully apprehend the issue. Hence, examining these also fall 
under the aim.  
 
In this regard the thesis aims at examining the previous and potential future use of the original18 
derogation possibilities under the Deliberate Release Directive,19 the Food and Feed Regulation 
(FFR),20 and Article 114.5 TFEU.21 The latter provision is part of the internal market rules, allowing 
                                                 
11 See chapter 2.2. 
12 See chapter 2.2.2. 
13 As will be shown in chapter 2.2.3, this has also had consequences for the functioning of the authorisation scheme as 
such.  
14 For instance Austria, Hungary, Luxemburg, Italy and France.  
15 See chapter 3. Others have also considered them questionable, see The Farmers Scientist Network, National GM bans 
scientifically unfounded and legally questionable:  http://greenbiotech.eu/2013/08/12/national-gm-bans-scientifically-
unfounded-and-legally-questionable/ 
16 This is a term found in documents from the Commission that is synonymous to the word restricting. 
17 Important actors in the GMO legislation context are the EU Courts, i.e. the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU), the Commission and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). See chapter 1.4.  
18 They are original in the sense that they existed before, and remain unchanged by the amendment through Directive 
2015/412.  
19 DIRECTIVE 2001/18/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 12 March 2001 
on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 
90/220/EEC. Hereafter “Deliberate Release Directive”. 
20 REGULATION (EC) No 1829/2003 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 22 
September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed. Hereafter “FFR”. 
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for general derogations in harmonised areas, such as the one before us.  The two former legislative 
acts are central22 parts in the regulation of GM cultivation and allow for so-called safeguard 
measures, emergency measures and coexistence measures. The provision dealing with coexistence 
stands out from the others as it de-harmonises specific issues of socioeconomic character and 
provides for restrictive measures to be adopted on those grounds. In contrast, the three other 
original derogation provisions are concerned with safety issues, meaning science is an important 
part of their invocation.  
 
The aim is also to scrutinise the scope of the new Article 26b of Directive 2015/41223 - which 
amends the Deliberate Release Directive and partly de-harmonises the GMO regime - and to see 
how this changes the overall opt out possibilities. On paper the amendment opens up for a way out 
of GM cultivation through agreements with biotech companies and/or through invoking one or 
more of the new derogation grounds it provides for. In this regard, general Treaty law, such as the 
provisions on free movement, may restrict future reliance on this article. Hence, another objective is 
to examine the derogation possibilities in light of those general limitations in order to look closer on 
potential hurdles as to the new article’s actual scope. 
 
In line with this I seek to answer the following questions; 
 
-What is the scope for Member States to restrict cultivation of GM crops in response to the concerns that such 
cultivation raises?   
 
This question is in turn divided into a couple of sub-questions; 
 
- What is the scope for Member States to restrict cultivation of GM crops in their territories under the original opt out 
possibilities? 
 
- What is the scope for Member States to restrict cultivation of GM crops in their territories under the new Article 
26b and in what way will the overall scope change through this amendment? 
1.3 Delimitation 
Some delimitation is warranted here. Firstly, GMOs do not only come as seeds that can be 
cultivated. They also come as finished products or as part of products, such as in food or animal 
feed. Although it might already be implied by the aim and research questions I should clarify that 
the thesis is not concerned with derogations from the marketing and free circulation of authorised 
GMOs in general. It is explicitly concerned with the restrictions on cultivation of GM crops.24 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
21 The numbering of this article was changed from 95.5 after the agreement on the Lisbon Treaty. The new numbering 
on this and other Treaty articles are used throughout the thesis.  
22 See chapter 2.2. 
23 DIRECTIVE (EU) 2015/412 OF THE EURPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of March 2015 
amending Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation 
of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in their territory. Hereafter “Directive 2015/412”. 
24 However some of the examined derogation possibilities are of relevance to restrictions in general on GMOs, i.e. not 
only on their cultivation. These are Article 23 of the Deliberate Release Directive, Article 34 FFR and Article 114.5 
TFEU. 
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Secondly, restricting research on GM plants is not covered. It should be clarified that laboratory 
testing and so-called field trials25 are important aspects in approvals for future cultivation of GM 
crops and have raised opposition among the European public.26 However, spatially such research is 
of marginal importance. 
 
Thirdly, coexistence measures are not fully addressed.27 At least in theory coexistence measures 
provide a less stringent way for Member States to opt out of GM cultivation. Many Member States 
have adopted such measures, although their restrictive effects are not intended to be as far-reaching 
as those that are offered under the other opt out possibilities. As stated this area has already 
originally been expressly de-harmonised and it is concerned with certain socioeconomic impacts of 
GM cultivation. Being outside the harmonised area of the GMO regime this means that general 
Union law restrictions apply. As the overarching legal limitations under this law are somewhat the 
same for coexistence measures as for those applying to the new Article 26b, these are treated on a 
principle level in that context instead. Hence, coexistence is covered only to the extent that it shows 
that such measures allow for a different sort of concern to be taken into account when Member 
States want to restrict GM cultivation and to show that their over-use has not been challenged by 
the Commission.28  
 
Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, the issue of WTO compatibility is left out in the thesis. 
The new Article 26b does not only come with questions about restrictive measures’ conformity with 
EU law, but also with international trade law, which may affect the scope of national autonomy. 
Unfortunately there is no room in here to explore that issue,29 though it could be said shortly that 
WTO-law in principle allows for some space for pursuing certain legitimate values. However, it has 
been suggested that this space will not be simple to use.30 As such, non-EU states and the judicial 
bodies of the WTO could also come to determine the scope of EU Member States possibilities to 
opt out of GM cultivation. Whether non-EU states will be ready to challenge the legality of Member 
States’ national restrictions is unsure. 
 
Finally, I want to make clear that I do not have any normative ambitions with this thesis, as I only 
seek to examine the actual legal existing possibilities. Hence, de lege ferenda discussions about any 
desired state of affairs are left out.31 
                                                 
25 Field trials play an important role in the authorisation procedure to place GMOs on the market. Without them, a 
GMO can not obtain an authorisation to circulate within the internal market. See Poli 2010, p. 344. The possibilities to 
restrict field trials is not affected by the new Article 26b, Recital 19 Directive 2015/412. 
26 See Morris and Spillane 2010, p. 363.  
27 See Varela 2010 and Dobbs 2011 for more thorough examinations of coexistence measures .  
28 In addition they provide a fruitful background to understanding some of the case law in relation to other derogation 
possibilities, as well as the new Article 26b.  
29 For a contribution on WTO law compatibility of the new Article 26b as it stood in the 2010 Commission proposal, 
see Dobbs 2010. See also more generally, Pollack and Schaffer: When Cooperation Fails: International Law and Politics of 
Genetically Modified Foods, Oxford 2009. 
30 Lee 2013, p. 378; Lee 2014, p.244; Dobbs 2010, p. 1370ff. 
31 Lee writes somewhat critically about the narrow interpretation of coexistence measures in ‘The Governance of 
Coexistence Between GMOs and Other Forms of Agriculture: a Purely Economic Issue?”. In: Journal of Environmental 
Law Vol 20(2) 2008. For a critical perspective on the other original opt out possibilities see Lee 2014, p. 224-247. For  a 
critical perspective on the not final finalised version of Article 26b, see Poli 2013. 
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1.4 Method 
The thesis draws on legal dogmatic method in that de lege lata is examined regarding Member 
States’ different derogation possibilities. For current purposes, this means that the derogation 
possibilities are scrutinised from primary and secondary EU law in light of the case law from the 
EU Courts (CJEU) and legal literature. Furthermore, interpretations and decisions and guidelines 
from the Commission and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) are also of relevance to get 
a clear picture of the scope of opting out, especially so where there is an absence of case law from 
the CJEU on specific GMO provisions.  
 
This of course implies that these EU institutions are of importance when it comes to studying 
national restrictions on GM cultivation. The CJEU - in this context the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) and the General Court32- ensures the final interpretation and application of EU law, including 
the legislation on GMOs.33 The Commission oversees the implementation of Union law34 and has 
the power to bring Member States to the CJEU if it considers that Member State action is in breach 
of their legal duties.35 As will be shown it also has important procedural roles to play in the contexts 
of authorising GMOs to be cultivated and  in determining if national derogations are justified. 
Furthermore, as one of the potential36 actors to make Member States answer for breaches of Union 
obligations, its views - as represented in its guidelines and decisions - are of importance when 
predicting the prospect of Member States succeeding in adopting GM cultivation restrictions.37  
 
The EFSA has a central part in the scientific assessments of risk to health and the environment 
under the GMO legislation. As will be shown in chapter 2 and 3 their opinions matter a great deal in 
the authorisation process and when it comes to establishing that national derogations are justified. 
 
In accordance with this, the thesis examines the different legal documents produced by these 
institutional actors to better understand the legal possibilities and practical reality of opting out.  
 
Notwithstanding the thesis’s lack of normative aspirations, a critical perspective is applied. This is so 
particularly in 4.3 where the actual scope of the new Article 26b is examined in light of the internal 
market rules, in order to see the possible legal limits that this amendment has for Member States’ 
say on GM cultivation.  
1.5 Research status and materials 
Issues that stir up emotions tend to be well-covered by scholars.  Legal and political questions 
surrounding GMOs are no exception to this.38 However, when it comes to the possibilities for 
Member States to opt out of GM cultivation not that much has been written. Thus far, among the 
                                                 
32 The General Court was pre-Lisbon called Court of First Instance (CFI). 
33 Article 19.1 TEU. 
34 Article 17 ibid.. 
35 Article 258 TFEU. 
36 Member States have the same possibility under Article 259 TFEU. Private actors, i.e the biotech industry also have 
the (restricted) possibility under Article 263(4) TFEU, or through making a preliminary reference under Article 267 
TFEU. 
37 In my view this is particularly important in the context of the new Article 26b, where the legal position is uncertain.   
38 For a good general overview of EU regulation of GMOs, see Lee 2008. For a comparative analysis see Jasanoff, 
Sheila Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, Princeton 2005. 
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contributions of legal and political science scholars, nothing39 has been published since the content 
in the new Article 26b took its current form in December 2014. This does of course not imply that 
the subject of this thesis  is not relevant, instead I would like to claim the opposite; the issue is 
important to investigate further!   
 
In any case, among the legal scholars whose’ contributions are referred to in this thesis we find the 
likes of Pr. Marie Lee who is worth mentioning here. Being the author of “one of the most 
comprehensive scholarly analyses of EU regulation of GMOs”,40 her works are referred to in larger 
extent than any other authors’. As such, legal literature and peer-reviewed articles have been used 
mainly in relation to the background chapter (2), but also to some extent that it reflects relevant 
parts of the early versions of Article 26b.  
 
As mentioned above I mainly depart from primary and secondary EU law of relevance to Member 
States’ derogation possibilities when examining these. In this regard the Deliberate Release Directive 
and the FFR stand out, apart from the amending Directive 2015/412 that contains Article 26b.  
However, excursion to appurtenant procedural rules41 has also been necessary to understand the 
Member States’ autonomy on GMOs. In addition, case law from the CJEU and decisions and 
guidelines from the Commission has provided valuable material. 
1.6 Outline 
This introductionary part is followed by four main chapters. In order to set the scene for the reader 
a background chapter (2) is provided. This offers a brief presentation of GMOs and some common 
promises and concerns that come along with GM agriculture, which is useful for understanding the 
grounds on which Member States base their restrictions. The chapter also includes a historical and 
contemporary overview of the EU’s GMO regime and its part in the internal market context. The 
authorisation procedure, through which GMOs need to be approved in order to be cultivated 
within the EU is the starting point of Member States’ opt out possibilities. As such this procedure 
and its functioning in practise is quite thoroughly described.  
 
After setting the scene, the thesis moves on to examine the legal provisions that  Member States 
may rely on when it comes to restricting GM cultivation. Chapter 3 examines the legal scope and - 
due to the procedural rules –interesting practical implications of the original opt out provisions. As 
stated above, these provisions allow for safeguard measures under the Deliberate Release Directive, 
emergency measures under the FFR and measures under Article 114.5 TFEU. In addition, the scope 
and practice of coexistence measures, which are also provided for under the GMO legislation is 
(briefly) examined.  
 
Next, the new Article 26b, which was adopted in 2015, is treated in chapter 4. This is a provision 
that is exclusively concerned with cultivation restrictions. The chapter includes key aspects of the 
long-drawn legislative process that formed its final contents. This helps understanding its scope, 
                                                 
39 To be sure, this is to the best of the knowledge of the undersigned.  
40 Weimer 2014, p. 17. 
41 See e.g. the so-called “Comitology rules”. COUNCIL DECISION 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the 
procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission; REGULATION (EU) 182/2011 
OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and 
general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing 
powers. Hereafter “Comoitology Decision” and “Comitology Regulation” respectively. 
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which is also thoroughly examined. The chapter’s final part puts the new derogation possibilities to 
test against possible hurdles under internal market law in order to estimate their actual scope in light 
of these potential limitations.   
 
Comments are made and conclusions are drawn of the findings throughout these chapters. In 
addition chapter 5 provides for some final considerations as to Member States’ derogation 
possibilities.  
 11 
2 Setting the scene 
This chapter starts by introducing the concept of GMOs and some promises and concerns that are 
commonly associated them when it comes to GM agriculture (2.1). After this, a brief overview of 
the EU’s regulatory framework on GMOs is given (2.2). This overview introduces the internal 
market context, provides for a historical background and explains the logic and cornerstones of the 
framework as it stands today in light of GM cultivation. Finally, the structure and implications of 
the authorisation procedure for GMOs are examined. Altogether, this sets the scene for examining 
Member States’ autonomy regarding cultivation of GM crops in their territories. This provides 
valuable background information in order to better understand Member States’ opt out possibilities. 
 
The chapter shows that there is a wide range of concerns for Member States with regards to GM 
cultivation, which could be categorised as safety concerns, i.e.  as concerns for risks to health and 
environment, various socioeconomic and ethical concerns. Moreover, it is shown that the GMO 
framework is built on the logic of creating an internal market for GMOs, where at the same time 
risks to the environment and health are assessed before a GM variety can be authorised for 
cultivation purposes. In practice, the authorisation process takes little account of concerns other 
than those regarding risks for health and the environment. By drawing on the EFSA’s positive 
opinions as regards the safety of all GMOs that have passed the authorisation procedure, the 
Commission has pushed through authorisations in spite of the objections of many Member States. 
Being a sensitive political issue, there has also been substantial delays regarding authorisations of 
GMOs for cultivation purposes, which runs counter to the very idea of the scheme.  
 
2.1 GMOs – a brief introduction to a diversity of 
prospects and concerns 
Mankind has been occupied with manipulation of plant and animal genes for anthropocentric 
purposes for millennia.42 However, until fairly recently, such undertakings were done in ignorance of 
the existence of the gene. The manipulation of living organisms at the level of the gene can be 
traced back the 19th century discovery by Mendel of the inheritability of the characteristics of living 
organisms. As knowledge accumulated regarding DNA being the carrier of genetic information 
during the mid 1900s, the practical step to genetic engineering was attainable. By 1973, the first 
GMO was created in the USA by inserting toad DNA into a bacterial cell. Inherent to genetic 
engineering is that  it is not restricted by laws of sexual compatibility, something that had thus far 
always meant that a bacterium could not be “crossed” with, for instance, a toad. Instead, this 
technology can isolate the DNA fragments responsible for a desired trait, manipulate that gene in a 
laboratory, and potentially insert it into any other living organism.43 As for today, a wide array of 
GMOs with different traits exists. Among those that are cultivated, GM crops with traits ranging 
from herbicide tolerance to improved nutritional value are now commonplace in some parts of the 
world.44 
 
                                                 
42 For example, traditional breeding has for a long time involved ‘crossing’ animals or plants in search of preferred traits, 
such as enhanced productivity. See Lee 2008, p. 11f. 
43 Ibid, p. 11f. 
44 For a closer look, see ISAAA, GM Approval Database: http://www.isaaa.org/gmapprovaldatabase/default.asp  
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Genetic engineering can astonish in its ingenuity and its potential. However, regulating GMOs is 
not a simple task as disagreement about the appropriate role of GMOs in agriculture and food 
production is not seldom intense and bad-tempered.45  Whereas some think that it offers a never 
before experienced change in human relationships with the environment, others view the 
technology as simply the next step in our constant efforts to control it.46  
 
But what is it that GMOs promise and what are the concerns that they raise?47 We now turn to a 
short examination of some typically held benefits of GM agriculture and some commonly raised 
concerns by its opponents. Notably, these concerns have in one way or another been put forward 
by Member States in attempts to derogate from the harmonised framework.48  
 
First, as part of the post-industrial hope of the ‘knowledge-economy’, genetic engineering is often 
held to deliver substantial economic promise.49 However, the potential benefits seem to be limited 
only by imagination. They are additionally claimed to include advantages with regards to the 
environment, health as well as socioeconomic, political and ethical benefits.50  
 
Regarding the environment, hoped-for benefits address a myriad of problems often associated with 
conventional farming. Examples include or could include GM plants constructed to cope without 
the need of fertilisers, something that would spare water sources from being polluted by them.51 
Genetic modifications that address various health issues, for both the wealthy and the poor, are 
another promise. For instance the ”golden rice” is modified to contain higher levels of vitamin A, 
which is often deficient among children with a diet heavily dependent on rice, leading to diseases 
and blindness.52  
 
On the other hand, GMOs also come with a set of safety concerns, notably in relation to the 
environment and human and animal health. Examples of common concerns include increased 
herbicide and pesticide tolerance. Other worries include those of crops that are modified to kill 
particular pests also may be toxic to non-target species and uncontrolled contamination of the 
natural environment through, for instance, cross-pollination.53 Safety concerns also include 
potentially serious risks to human health from the cultivation or consumption of GMOs.54  
 
It shall be noted that negative environmental and health impacts are often disputed.55 Many of the 
safety risks are surrounded with scientific uncertainty, and GM-opponents often point at limitations 
                                                 
45 Lee 2008, p. 11f. 
46 Ibid, p. 22.  
47 For a detailed examination of the main concerns, see UK Science Review, GM Science Review: First Report:  An open 
review of the science relevant to GM crops and food based on the interests and concerns of the public: http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-
files/Guardian/documents/2003/07/21/gmsci-report1-full.pdf . For a discussion and an overview of the applications 
of genetic engineering in other areas than agriculture, see Zika, Eleni et al. Consequences, Opportunities and Challenges of 
Modern Biotechnology for Europe: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/default/files/jrc_reference_report_200704_biotech.pdf .  
48 See chapters 3 and 4. 
49 In the EU context, see Commission, COM (2002) 27 final, p. 7. 
50 Lee 2008, p. 23.  
51 Another example is crops carefully modified to be pest resistant, which could hinder loss of biodiversity associated 
with use of chemical pesticides. Yet another one is modifications to improve yields, which would allow for less land use, 
implying both environmental economic benefits. See Lee 2008, p. 23f. 
52 ibid, p. 25f 
53 UK Science Review, p. 210.  
54 Examples of worries are that modified genes could enter cells in the human gut, or that GM food or GM pollen 
might cause allergic reactions. See Lee 2008, p. 28.  
55 See e.g. chapter 3 on the differences between Member States and the EFSA. 
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of knowledge derived from laboratory testing, which they hold is not valid in relation to complex 
ecological and behavioural real-world conditions.56  
 
There are also concerns about agricultural biotechnology that are not directly linked to the safety 
concerns just mentioned.  These concerns could be categorised as being of socioeconomic or ethical 
nature, although, many of them could be seen as interrelated with each other and safety concerns 
and are not easily put into distinct categories. As will be shown in chapters 3 and 4 such 
interrelation can be difficult when Member States try to prove that that they are pursuing legitimate 
concerns for opting out.57  
 
Many fears about socioeconomic impacts of GM agriculture are tied to underlying concerns 
regarding unwanted contamination of non-GM seed and crops. Apart from the possible 
environmental questions this might raise, this is also linked with concerns about consumer choice 
and difficulties for farmers wishing to market their crop as being free of GMOs.  Such aspects are 
often held to be to the economical detriment of small-scale and ecological farmers and as such 
affecting social, environmental and rural development benefits associated with those types of 
agriculture.58 These are issues that coexistence measures are explicitly  concerned with.59 
 
There is also an array of ethical questions and concerns in relation to GMOs. Perhaps most notable 
are those of a religious character, with certain approaches to the intrinsic value of nature and 
reluctance to playing “God” through technology.60 However, safety questions also raise ethical 
issues, such as the level of acceptability of risk to the environment or producers, and responsibilities 
for future generations.  
 
This brief overview has shown that cultivation of GM crops is accompanied with many promises, 
but also raises an extensive range of concerns, not all of which have been covered here. The scope 
of opting out of GM cultivation on the grounds of such concerns will be examined after the 
following introduction to the EU framework on GMOs. 
2.2 The EU Framework on GMOs 
Before moving on to the development and content of the EU legislative framework on GMOs, 
something needs to be said about the logic and context this regime exists in. In order to apprehend 
the expositions and discussions that follow in the thesis, the role and significance of internal market 
in the GMOs legislative context is to be particularly stressed here. The internal market is of central 
importance to the purposes of the EU.61  If it were not for concerns about barriers to trade, there 
would be “little reason” why regulation of GMOs is not left completely to Member States to decide 
on. Free movement of goods, including those produced by genetic engineering, is not just seen as 
important in its own right or as simply a means of reaching economic prosperity. Instead, economic 
                                                 
56 Lee 2008, p. 29f. 
57 This was the case in the cases of Land Oberösterreich and Commission v Poland. See chapter 3.2 and 4.3.  
58 Lee 2014, p. 236f. Another example is that commercial cultivation of GM crops is often accompanied with worries of 
enhanced large corporate control over agriculture. Enhanced corporate control is for example held to be enhanced by 
intellectual property protection, which might enable greater control by single suppliers over different elements of 
agriculture, such as when the same company supplies herbicide-resistant seed and the herbicide. See Hughes 2007, p. 
318, 325 ff.  
59 See chapter 3.3. 
60 Kirkham, 2006, p. 176. See chapter 4 regarding Member States possibilities to opt out on such grounds. 
61 See Preamble to TEU and Article 3.3 TEU and Article 26 TFEU; See also chapter 4. 
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integration has been the symbol and a foundation of political integration ever since the birth of the 
EU.62 As such, different national approaches to regulation of GMOs could raise barriers to the 
completion of the completion of the internal market, and in turn threaten the Union’s core 
ambitions. On a more specific level the competitive implications following market fragmentation is 
that Member States that restrict cultivation put their farmers at a disadvantage when confronted 
with more cheaply produced products derived from authorised GMOs than can still circulate freely 
on the market.63 
 
 The GMO framework is largely built and adopted on the basis of the a priori shared competence of 
Article 114 TFEU, which forms the legal basis for harmonising measures that have as their 
objective to establish and further the functioning of the internal market.64 In principle the 
harmonisation and connection to Article 114 means that national derogations are limited to the 
grounds explicit in the provisions provided for in the GMO legislation or the Treaties. As stated 
above,65 these grounds have mainly66 been related to protection of the environment and health, i.e. 
safety concerns. However, as will be shown in chapter 4, the new Article 26b explicitly de-
harmonises some aspects of the GMO framework. This makes a broader list of concerns available 
for the Member States to base derogating measures on, which however may conflict with still-
applicable free movement obligations. 
 
2.2.1 Historical background  
As genetic engineering first entered the scene in Europe, its potential risks were only partly 
regulated at national levels across the Member States and coincidentally through various EU 
agricultural and food safety regulations. The Member States’ divergent stances regarding the value 
of certain agricultural and food safety practices, acceptable level of risks and the benefits of GMOs, 
are reflected in their regulatory models at the time.  For instance, Germany and Denmark had quite 
restrictive laws, whereas the UK had rather permissive ones.67  
 
The EU initially focused heavily on research to explore and exploit the full potential of this new 
technology.68 Realising  however that GMOs potentially posed risks to the environment and health 
and that such a regulatory fragmentation threatened to undermine the benefits of GMOs by 
allowing competitive distortions and hindering trade,69 the Commission soon proposed for a union-
wide framework regulating biotechnology.70 In 1990, this proposal took the form of two old 
                                                 
62 With the ultimate goal of promoting peace. See for instance Article 3 TEU. Cf, Lee 2008, p. 93ff. 
63 See Smith 2012, p. 866 and Geelhoed 2014, p. 25. See chapter 2.2.1 on the driving forces behind establishing the 
regime in the first place. 
64 Article 114.1 TFEU. In addition Article 114.3 holds that harmonising measures concerned with health, and 
environmental protection shall “take as a base a high level of protection”, when proposed by the Commission. This is 
something that the EP and the Council shall only “seek to achieve”.  
65 See chapter 1.2. 
66 Economical risks for farmers from contamination of GMOs are explicitly recognised to be falling outside the scope 
of the harmonised GMO regime and can to a certain extent be regulated on Member State level through coexistence 
measures. See chapter 3.3. 
67 See Geelhoed 2014, p. 8; Schaffer and Pollack 2004, p. 8. 
68 The Commission has continuously emphasised the economic value of biotechnology. See e.g. Commission, COM 
(2002) 27 final., p.7. 
69 Geelhoed 2014, p. 3. 
70 Commission,  COM (1986) 573.   
 15 
directives applicable to the contained use71 and deliberate release of GMOs.72 Since this time, the 
deliberate release into the environment of GMOs has required authorisation throughout the EU, 
following a case-by-case assessment of risks to the environment and health.73  
 
During this early period, a number of GM seeds were authorised for the purpose of cultivation 
within the EU. However, the old framework soon came to be perceived as inadequate for the 
regulation of agricultural biotechnology. Instead of imposing uniform standards, the old directives 
relied on mutual recognition of very discretionary national risk assessment, which was only to be 
forwarded to an EU level-procedure in case of reasoned objections.74 The lack of uniform standards 
in the risk assessment area was followed by a reluctance to accept “foreign science” much due to 
the fact that public opinion had come to turn against75 genetic engineering in some Member States.76 
 
During a time of heavy public opposition, the Commission decided to authorise yet another GM 
crop variety, despite angry objections from a number of Member States. When the new millennium 
approached, twelve Member States vocalised their opposition to further authorisations of GMOs.77  
 
This inaugurated the notorious “de facto moratorium” on new authorisations between 1998 and 
2004. Furthermore, with doubtful legality, a number of Member States banned from their territory 
GMOs that had already been approved at EU level.78 The Commission, however, restrained from 
taking enforcing action in spite of the questionable legality of these measures, and used the period 
for negotiating new legislation. Among other things,79 the group of dissatisfied Member States 
insisted on stricter risk assessments of the safety of GMOs. This standstill period somewhat hushed 
the internal disapproval.80  
 
The EU soon came to adopt a more centralised “new” GMO regime that remains in place today.81  
It has been held that “there was never a clear and unified EU decision” regarding this new regime. 
Hence, the conflicts after the moratorium have not decreased.82 Anyhow, this second set of EU 
GMO legislation is the starting point for the further analysis of this thesis.  
 
                                                 
71 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 90/219/EEC of 23 April 1990 on the contained use of genetically modified micro-
organisms. 
72 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 90/220/EEC of 23 April 1990 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically 
modified organisms. Hereafter Old Deliberate Release Directive. Herafter “Old Deliberate Release Directive”. 
73 Ever since the establishment of the GMO regime, the authorisation scheme has been underpinned by the premise 
that the process of genetic engineering is a novel one, meaning that GMOs cannot be assumed to be equivalent to their 
traditional counterparts in their safety. This is in sharp contrast to their regulation in the USA. See Skogstad 2011, p. 
901. 
74 Article 13.3 Old Deliberate Release Directive.   
75 In some cases GMO trial fields were destroyed by groups in front of both media and the police. These events were 
widely reported in media. Lee 2008, p. 19f. 
76 Geelhoed 2014, p. 3f. This is commonly attributed to the poor management of the BSE crisis and the ’mad cow’ 
scandal. Moreover the EU was experiencing extensive legitimacy problems at the time. See e.g. Falkner 2007, p. 517f.  
This implies that safety concerns seems to have been the main driving force behind the change in public opinion.  
77 Lee 2008 p. 2f, 62. 
78 The safeguard clause in Article 16 of the Old Deliberate Release Directive was used to impose nine national bans. 
Austria, Italy and Luxemburg were among the ones to invoke this original safeguard clause. See Skogstad 2011, p. 902 
and Dobbs 2010, p. 1388. 
79 They also required rules on labelling, traceability and liability, rules that to a large extent came into place with the new 
regime. See Lee 2008, s. 62f 
80 However, the situation also lead up to international trade trials before the WTO, See Geelhoed 2014, p. 3f. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Lee 2008, p. 63. 
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2.2.2 The EU framework on GMOs in light of cultivation 
As for today, the EU has put in place a rather complex legal framework covering nearly all aspects 
of GMOs. In the words of the Commission this framework “pursues the global objective of 
ensuring a high level of protection of human life and health and welfare, environment and 
consumer interests”, while at the same time “ensuring that the internal market works effectively”.83  
2001 saw the adoption of the “new” Deliberate Release Directive applying to all GMOs for release 
into the environment or placing on the market. By 2003, two other major pieces of legislation were 
put in place. These are the Food and Feed Regulation (FFR), applying special rules to GM food and 
feed, and the Traceability and Labelling Regulation (TLR), 84  putting in place rules on labelling and 
traceability for all GMOs.85  
 
Whereas the TLR is outside the scope of this thesis, the Deliberate Release Directive and the FFR 
are of immediate relevance for cultivation of GMOs. The former regulates the deliberate release 
into the environment of GMOs i.e. their cultivation..  This Directive has its legal basis in Article 114 
TFEU. It pursues the double objective of approximating laws of the Member States and to protect 
human health and the environment when releasing GMOs into the environment (or placing them 
on the market).86. With regards to legal basis and objectives of the FFR, these are somewhat broader 
than for the Deliberate Release Directive.87 The regulation is based on the provisions for the 
common agricultural policy and public health,88 in addition to Article 114. Thus, ensuring the 
effective functioning of the market is not the only objective the FFR seeks to pursue, as it also shall 
ensure a high level of protection of human life and health, animal health and welfare, environment 
and consumer interests.  
 
These two, occasionally overlapping, pieces of legislation are built on a precautionary logic,89 and 
provide that no GMO shall be cultivated (or marketed) within the Union unless previously notified 
and authorised after undergoing an environmental risk assessment.90  A GM crop, like any other 
GMO, may only be authorised if it is found not to constitute a risk to human health or the 
environment.91 The authorisation process occurs mainly at the EU level and an authorisation applies 
                                                 
83 Commission, Biotechnology: http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biotechnology/index_en.htm  
84 REGULATION (EC) No 1830/2003 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 22 
September 2003 concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically modified organisms and the traceability of food 
and feed products produced from genetically modified organisms and amending Directive 2001/18/EC. 
85 Labelling is intended to guarantee consumer choice, and the traceability provisions are intended to track and recall 
GM products in the event of safety issues, Skogstad 2011, p 903. 
86 Article 1, Recitals 5 and 7 Deliberate Release Directive. 
87 Article 1a FFR. 
88 Articles 43 and 168.4(b) TFEU, respectively. 
89 See Article 1 and Recital 8 Deliberate Release Directive. Article 1 FFR refers to REGULATION (EC) No 178/2002 
OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 28 January 2002 laying down the general 
principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures 
in matters of food safety. Hereafter Regulation 178/2002. In this regard, see Article 7. 
90 Recital 32 and Article 4(1) Deliberate Release Directive; Article 4(2) FFR.  The precautionary principle plays a role in 
two different contexts of the GMO framework. The first being an institutional and procedural principle that guided the 
drafting of the legislation, influencing the authorisation process provided therein. The second being that it has been 
defined as a decision rule that shall guide the case-by-case decision making in single authorisation procedures. Weimer 
2010(b), p. 637. See Weimer 2010(b) in full for a critical examination on the application of the precautionary principle in 
this context. 
91 Additionally, a GM seed should not be harmful from the point of view of plant health to cultivation of other varieties 
or species. See Article 18 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2002/53 of 13 June 2002 on the common catalogue of varieties of 
agricultural plant species.  
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to all Member States, meaning that in principle the effect of an authorisation is that an authorised 
GM seed can be grown anywhere in the EU.92  
 
Contingent on the scope of the biotech company’s authorisation application, cultivation of a GM 
crop is subject to either the procedure in the Deliberate Release Directive or the FFR. Somewhat 
simplified, the former is applicable when the applicant intends for the GM crop to be placed on the 
market for the purpose of cultivation without an intention for the crops to be used in food or 
animal feed.93 The FFR applies if the applicant wishes to cultivate the GM crop and also sell it on 
the market as food or animal feed.94 In that case the applicant has the possibility to submit a single 
application for authorisation under the FFR.95 The authorisation procedure itself is also governed by 
Comitology rules,96 the effect of which will be explored below. 
 
Furthermore, the legislation that governed the authorisation also determines to a certain degree 
what original opt out measures Member States may rely on if they wish to restrict or prohibit 
cultivation of GM crops. This will be elaborated with more in chapter 3, but first the authorisation 
procedure will be shortly described in theory and practise. This is done in order to shed light on the 
Member States’ saying in the authorisation process on allowing specific GM crops to be cultivated 
in their respective territories in the first place. It should be noted that the amendments to the 
Deliberate Release Directive somewhat changes Member States’ autonomy in this regard. However, 
this change will be treated in chapter 4. 
2.2.3 Authorisation of GMOs – a centralised approach  
While the procedural rules under the Deliberate Release Directive and the FFR are not identical,97  
the common pattern and reality of the authorisation process will be explained here.98  
 
In the initial risk assessment stage, the economic operator (the applicant) submits an application 
including a risk assessment of its GMO to the competent authority in the Member State where it 
first wishes to market the GMO. The competent national authority thereafter sends the application 
to the EFSA that oversees the risk assessment regarding the GMO in relation to risks to the 
environment, human and animal health.99 Based on the assessment, the EFSA delivers a risk 
assessment opinion to the Commission,100 which is the first actor in the risk-management phase. 
Following this, the Commission formulates a draft decision, where it shall take into consideration 
both the possible scientific uncertainties and “other legitimate factors”.101 The draft decision is later 
                                                 
92 Lee 2014, p. 227. 
93 Article 1 Deliberate Release Directive. Examples could be GM cotton or flowers.  
94 Article 3 FFR.  
95 Article 17.5 FFR. Then subject to an environmental risk assessment under the Deliberate Release Directive. 
96 The Comitology Decision and the  Comitology Regulation..  
97 Cf. Articles 13-18 Deliberate Release Directive and  Articles 5-6 FFR.  
98 This is done since the applications under the Deliberate Release Directive in practice invariably turn into a similar 
EU-level procedure to the one described, due to lack of mutual agreement of national risk assessments. Cf. Weimer 
2010, p. 635. 
99 Article 28 Deliberate Release Directive and Article 5.1-2 and 17.1-2 FFR.  However EFSA does not perform their 
own safety tests. 
100 Article 18.6 FFR and Article 28 Deliberate Release Directive.   
101 The Commission is allowed to adopt a different stance on motivated grounds, see Article 19.1 FFR and Article 28 
Deliberate Release Directive. As for “other legitimate factors”, see below. 
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submitted to either the Regulatory Committee or the Standing Committee on Food Chain and 
Animal Health (SCFAH), consisting of expert Member State representatives.102  
 
In order for the Committees to approve or reject the draft authorisation decision a qualified 
majority (QM) is necessary.103 If a QM is not possible to reach - or if the vote, in contrast to the 
Commission’s draft decision, results in a disapproval of authorisation - the Commission refers the 
issue to an Appeal Committee.104 The Appeal Committee, which has the position that was 
previously afforded the Council,105 consists of representatives selected by the Member States.106 A 
QM decision is also required from the Appeal Committee for either approval or rejection of the 
draft decision. However, when a QM is not reached here, the Commission owns the question again. 
Whereas earlier Comitology rules put the Commission under an obligation to adopt its initial 
decision in such cases, the Commission now has the possibility to do so.107  
 
The functioning of the authorisation procedure in practice reveals some important insights as to 
why Member States have had recourse to the original derogation possibilities and why the 
Commission brought forth its proposal for the new Article 26b.  
 
To begin with, research has shown that the Commission’s draft authorisation decisions are 
overwhelmingly based on the EFSA’s positive108 scientific opinions rather than on competing 
evidence from the Member States or other stakeholders such as environmental groups.109 Secondly, 
Member States’ representatives in different stages of the procedure have struggled to reach a QM to 
reject or adopt the Commissions draft decisions on authorisation of GMOs. The ultimate decision 
has therefore in practise frequently landed on the Commissions table where it has been “the sole 
force” behind post-moratorium GMO110 authorisations in the absence of QM decisions in 
comitology.111 
 
The authorisation regime envisions a strict division between risk assessment and risk management. 
This division relies on the idea of quantifying the likelihood of harm caused by (cultivation of) 
GMOs on the basis of scientific evidence. Geelhoed points out that such an idea, or presumption is 
undermined by the many uncertainties that exist in debates on the safety of GMOs.112 In contrast to 
the worries of some Member States, the EFSA  has almost exclusively adopted positive opinions by 
unanimity on submitted applications, signalling a confident view on the safety of GMOs.113 
Furthermore it has been shown that the centralised risk assessment approach tends to disregard 
national risk assessments,114 and some hold that they neglect the diversity and particularity of 
                                                 
102 Under the Deliberate Release Directive and FFR respectively. See Articles 3 and 5 Comitology Regulation 182/2011; 
and Article 35.1-2 FFR and Article 30 Deliberate Release Directive.   
103 Art 5 Comitology Regulation 182/2011. 
104 Pre March 2011 the application was referred to the Council in such cases. 
105 Lee 2013, p. 365. 
106 The pattern is that these representatives vote in line with stances of the Member States that have appointed them. 
See Weimer 2014, p. 6ff. 
107 Cf. Article 6.3 the Comitology Regulation 182/2011 and Article 5.6 Comitology Decision 1999/468/EC. 
108 In the sense of the safety of the GMOs assessed. 
109 Lee 2014 p. 226 and Geelhoed 2014, p. 6. 
110 Note that this overwhelmingly concerns authorisation for purposes other than cultivation, as explored below. 
111 Geelhoed, 2014 p. 6. Authorisation decisions can be found on; Commission, EU Register of Authorised GMOs:  
http://ec.europa.eu/food/dyna/gm_register/index_en.cfm 
112 Geelhoed 2014, p. 7f. 
113 Weimer 2014, p. 8. 
114 Instead research has shown that EFSA relies heavily on the information provides by the applicant. See Geelhoed 
2014, p. 7. 
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environmental conditions in the different Member States.115 The consequences being that some 
Member States have felt unheard of their divergent scientific outlooks on the risk assessments.116   
 
Neither the EFSA, nor the Commission have to this date accounted for non-scientific concerns, 
such as societal concerns of a socioeconomic or ethical character, in their opinions and draft 
decisions.117 The EFSA has concluded that it is not in their position to integrate social and ethical 
considerations into its work.118 As for the Commission it is allowed to consult an ethical committee 
before it drafts its decision,119 and rely on “other legitimate factors” than science to base its 
decisions on.120  
 
The central role that the EFSA and the Commission has come to play has raised questions about 
the legitimacy of the authorisation process among Member States.121 Criticism has concerned both 
the quality of the EFSA’s risk assessment, as well as the absence of taking into account of the other 
legitimate factors in the Commission’s risk management decisions.122 While the authorisation 
procedure in theory provides for taking into account different Member States’ views, in practice it 
has not done so. As such the authorisation practice shows a purely science-based approach to GMO 
authorisation123 and critics point at the “procedure’s disregard for diversity in and beyond 
science”.124   
 
However, this science-based approach, where GMOs are authorised in spite of relatively strong 
Member State opposition is only part of the picture. Public and Member State opposition against 
the authorisation scheme has resulted in quite a dysfunctional authorisation system.125  With regards 
to cultivation of GM crops, this whole process has in the last two decades resulted in merely one 
currently valid and one recently annulled authorisation. These concern the insect resistant MON810 
Maize126 and Amflora Potato,127 respectively. Yet, there are a number of cases where the 
Commission, despite positive EFSA opinions, have not taken action for a long time, and hence 
delayed the authorisation process.128  
 
The authorisation process concerning cultivation of the above-mentioned Amflora Potato serves as 
an illustrative case here. In that case it took five years, and the threat of legal action by the applicant, 
between the final EFSA opinion and the final authorisation.129  As for today a number of 
authorisations for GM cultivation purposes decisions are pending final decisions after long delays, 
                                                 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Weimer 2010, p. 646; Geelhoed 2014, p. 9. 
118 Poli 2013, p. 143, 149. 
119 Article 29 Deliberate Release Directive and Article 33 FFR. 
120 Recital 32 and Article 7 and 19.1 FFR.  
121 Many changes in the authorisation process have suggested in the doctrine. Klika et al, 2013, suggest outsourcing of 
the risk assessment to an independent agency to enhance the credibility of the Commission’s proposal. Skogstad 2011, 
has suggested that democratic legitimacy would increase by giving government representatives in principle the final say.  
122 Weimer 2010, p. 647. With regards to MON810 the EFSA was criticised for underestimating the level of uncertainty 
surrounding its effects on the environment. See Poli 2013, p. 147. 
123 Weimer 2010, p. 647. 
124 Geelhoed, 2014 p. 5ff. 
125 Already in 2008 a review of the framework pointed out the delays that the procedure caused. See, COUNCIL.  
2912th Council meeting, , 4 December 2008. 
126 See Commission, Decision  98/294/EC. 
127 See Commission, Decision 2010/135/EU and Case T-240/10 Hungary v Commission .  
128 Weimer 2010, p. 647. 
129 The time from application to final consent was thirteen years. The final decision was taken by the Commission in the 
absence of a QM decision in comitology, Lee, 2014, p. 227. 
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including another insect-resistant maize, GM Maize 1507.130  Also the procedure of Maize 1507 has 
been marked by delay. This has resulted in the CFI finding a breach of the Commission’s 
procedural obligations as it had not submitted its proposal to the Council after the comitology 
committee had failed to reach a QM.131 All in all this process has taken more than a decade from the 
time of the submission of the application.132  These massive delays could be seen as going against 
the objective of an effective internal market in GMOs.133  
 
Thinking of the legal effect134 of an authorisation of a GM crop there are high stakes in the 
authorisation process and the difficulties with finding compromises between the involved actors are 
quite understandable.  However, the authorisation of GM crops has led some Member States to 
shield and preserve their non-cultivation stances after authorisation. The legal possibilities and the 
actual practise of doing so will be examined next. 
                                                 
130 Weimer 2014, p. 27; Commission, EU Register of auhorisaed GMOs:  
http://ec.europa.eu/food/dyna/gm_register/index_en.cfm 
131 Case T-164/10, Pioneer Hi-Bred International v Commission. 
132 Weimer and Pisani 2014, p. 211.  
133 It is probable that the delays are the main reason for why the Commission put forth the proposal for the new Article 
26b.  See chapter 4.  
134 As stated above, as a starting point it can be cultivated throughout the Union.  
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3 The original opt out possibilites – 
science as key 
With the lack of recognition of Member States’ diverse concerns in the authorisation process in 
mind, this chapter explores the original, still existing possibilities for Member States to adopt 
restrictive post-authorisation measures on cultivation of GM crops. In doing so this chapter seeks 
to examine the scope for opting out on of GM cultivation through reliance on these original 
provisions, thus answering the first subquestion.  
 
As mentioned above, the Deliberate Release Directive and the FFR135 were both adopted on the 
basis of the equivalent to Article 114 TFEU, with a view to harmonise national laws in order to 
ensure the effective functioning of the internal market. To the extent that the GMO regime is 
harmonised,136 Member States seeking partially or fully to limit cultivation in their territories can 
only do so through the explicit derogation provisions offered by EU law, of which the GMO 
framework is part.  
 
The chapter begins by examining the legal possibilities and the reality of opting out under the 
specific derogation provisions of the GMO legislation, namely Article 23 of the Deliberate Release 
Directive, Article 34 of the FFR (3.1). This is followed by an examination of the opt out possibilities 
under the TFEU’s internal market rules, where the so-called “environmental guarantee” in Article 
114.5 TFEU provides for an alternative route to derogate from harmonised measures (3.2). In one 
way or another, these three provisions hold protection of the environment and/or health as the 
only legitimate grounds of concern, meaning that scientific evidence is of great importance when 
Member States seek to justify restrictions on GM cultivation under them. In addition, a less 
stringent form of opting out is provided for in Article 26a of the Deliberate Release Directive is 
introduced.  This article allows for coexistence measures, on grounds to hinder economical losses 
for conventional and organic farmers due to contamination from GMOs (3.3). 
 
It will be shown that in theory the legal scope for Member States to rely on the first three “science-
based” provisions is narrow. This is especially due to restrictive interpretations of the substantive 
conditions made by the EU Courts, the Commission and the EFSA. However, the procedural 
Comitology rules and a rather lax approach from the Commission in other cases has allowed for 
Member States to keep their national restrictions.. This means that to a certain degree, the legal 
scope of these opt out possibilities has been widened in practice, arguably against the intended use 
of the derogation possibilities.  
 
As for coexistence measures their scope was somewhat increased by Commission guidelines in 
2010, in connection to its proposal of the new Article 26b. However, their scope has not been 
tested by the CJEU. It is likely that general principles of EU law, such as proportionality, should 
hinder them from being used to impose larger territorial bans. This runs opposite to how they have 
been used in some cases. These latter issues are indirectly elaborated with further in chapter 4.3.  
 
                                                 
135 In this case partially, see chapter 2.2. 
136 Note that in the context of derogation, the new Article 26b de-harmonises areas that are not covered by the EFSA’s 
environmental risk assessment. See chapter 4.  
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3.1 Under the GMO legislation - Safeguard and 
Emergency measures on specific GMOs  
Article 114.10 TFEU provides that Union measures based on Article 114, in appropriate cases shall 
include “safeguard” clauses. These safeguard clauses authorise Member States to take “provisional” 
restrictive measures subject to Union control procedures.137 In the GMO framework Article 23 of 
the Deliberate Release Directive and Article 34 FFR include such provisions, allowing for safeguard 
and emergency measures respectively on specific GM crops. Which one of these two articles a 
Member State should rely on when restricting cultivation depends on what piece of legislation the 
GMO in question was authorised under. Restrictions on GMOs authorised under the FFR may for 
instance only be undertaken on the basis of Article 34 and not Article 23 of the Deliberate Release 
Directive.138 
3.1.1 Article 23 Deliberate Release Directive and Article 34 
FFR – in theory 
3.1.1.1 Substantive conditions 
The safeguard clause in Article 23 of the Deliberate Release Directive allows for a Member State to 
employ provisional safeguard measures to restrict or prohibit cultivation of specific authorised GM 
crops in its territory on a case-by-case basis.  
 
This requires the Member State to have “detailed grounds for considering” that the GMO in 
question “constitutes a risk to human health or the environment”.139 These grounds for 
consideration shall be a result of “new or additional information” made available after the date of 
authorisation and affect the environmental risk assessment or be the result of a “reassessment of 
existing information on the basis of new or additional scientific knowledge”.140  
 
Under the FFR, Article 34 allows for “urgently” needed national emergency measures to restrict 
cultivation of specific GM crops where it is “evident” that the authorisation of the GMO is “likely 
to constitute a serious risk to human health, animal health or the environment”.141  
 
The two provisions share a science-based approach, although a number of differences appear 
between the two articles when reading them side by side. Similarly to Article 23, legitimate concerns 
of Article 34 FFR are risks to human health and the environment, although with the addition that 
risk relating to animal health has been included in the latter. Whereas Article 23 requires Member 
States to demonstrate a “risk”, turning to emergency measures under Article 34 increases the 
threshold in that it requires demonstration of “serious risk”. Another difference is the standard of 
proof required. The safeguard clause in Article 23 requires “detailed grounds”, while Article 34 
                                                 
137 There is a similar provision for measures adopted under the “Environment Title“ in Article 191.2 TFEU. 
138 This issue was not entirely clear until 2011, see Joined Cases C-58/10 to C-68/10, Joined Cases C-58/10 to C-68/10 
Monsanto SAS and Others v Ministre de l’Agriculture et de la Peche,, para 59-63.   
139 Article 16 of the Old Deliberate Release Directive required that Member States put forward ”justifiable reasons” to 
consider that a GMO constituted a risk. What would had constituted justifiable reason was not entirely clear, Lee 2008, 
p. 89.  
140 Article 23.1 Deliberate Release Directive. Note that Article 20 ibid provides for Union action if new information 
becomes available that applies to the whole of EU. 
141 Emergency measures can also be triggered by an opinion by the EFSA, Article 34 FFR.  
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reads “where it is evident” that the GMO is “likely to constitute a risk”. The use of the wording 
“evident” indicates a higher standard of proof. 
 
The further meaning of these and similar conditions has been subject to interpretation by the ECJ.  
 
As for Article 23, the meaning of “detailed grounds” for considering that a GMO constitutes a 
“risk” to human health or the environment has not been directly up for interpretation by the EU 
courts. However, in 2003 in Case C-236/01 Monsanto (Italy),142 the ECJ interpreted an essentially 
identical safeguard clause of Regulation 258/97 concerning novel foods and novel food 
ingredient.143  
 
The Court held that in order to not adversely affect the functioning of the internal market and 
protection of public health, i.e. the objectives of that legislation, the following conditions had to be 
fulfilled. First, restrictive measures adopted under the safeguard clause may not be based on a 
“purely hypothetical approach to risk [to health (or the environment)], founded on mere 
suppositions which are not yet scientifically verified”.144 Such measures may, regardless of their 
temporary character and preventative nature, be adopted only if they are based on a risk assessment 
“which is as complete as possible in the particular circumstances of an individual case”. 
Furthermore, the results of this risk assessment shall indicate that the measure is “necessary” in 
order to ensure the safety of the protected interest.145  
 
In the joined cases C-58/10 to C-68/10, Monsanto (France),146 the conditions “likely” to constitute a 
“serious risk” in Article 34 FFR were interpreted.  These expressions were understood as being 
equivalent to a “significant risk which clearly jeopardises human health, animal health or the 
environment”. It was held that the risk in question must be established on the basis of new evidence 
based on reliable scientific data.147 The Court then went on to reiterate the conditions set forth in 
Monsanto (Italy), including that a purely hypothetical approach to risks founded on not scientifically 
verified assumptions is excluded.148 Hence, the same underlying conditions as for the evidence apply 
to Article 34 FFR. Furthermore, it was emphasised that in the light of the scheme provided for by 
FFR and its objective of avoiding “artificial treatment of serious risk”, the assessment and 
management of such risks ultimately come under the responsibility of the Commission and the 
Council, subject to review by the Union courts.149  
 
In Monsanto (Italy) the ECJ held that the safeguard clause had to be understood as giving specific 
expression to the precautionary principle and that its conditions must be interpreted in light of it. 
Drawing on earlier case law the court stated that uncertainties regarding the existence or extent of 
risk to the human health, could allow for protective measures from Member States “without having 
to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks to become fully apparent”.150 Hence, safeguard 
                                                 
142 Case C-236/01, Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA and Others v. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri and Others. Hereafter 
“Monsanto (Italy)”. 
143 See Article 12.1 REGULATION (EC) NO 258/97 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of 27 January 1997 concerning novel foods and novel food ingredients. The CJEU has not dealt with a 
Member State relying on Article 23 directly.  
144Case C-236/01, Monsanto (Italy), para 106.  
145 Ibid,  para 107. This indicates proportionality, which is elaborated with in chapter 4. 
146 Case C-58/10 to C-68/10, Monsanto v Ministre de l’Agriculture et de la peche [2011].  Hereafter ”Monsanto (France)” 
147 Ibid, para 76.  
148 Ibid,  para 77. 
149 Ibid,  para 78. 
150 Case C-236/01, Monsanto (Italy), para 110-114. 
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measures may be taken “even if it proves impossible to carry out as full a risk assessment as possible 
in the particular circumstances of a given case because of the inadequate nature of the available 
scientific data”. Still, such measures are only allowed if the Member State has carried out a risk 
assessment which is as complete as possible “given the particular circumstances of the particular 
case” and where, in the light of the precautionary principle, it is apparent that such measures are 
necessary. In such cases the Member State needs to provide “the most reliable scientific evidence 
available and the most recent results of international research” which makes it reasonably possible 
to conclude that the measures are necessary in order to avoid the risk.151    
 
However, in practice such a theoretical relaxation of Member States’ evidentiary burden has not 
been afforded the Member States relying on these two provisions when restricting GM agriculture. 
As will be shown in 3.1.2 Member States have invariably been unable to convince the EFSA and the 
Commission that the substantive requirements and their evidential thresholds have been fulfilled.  
 
We now turn to introducing the procedural conditions of the two provisions and the rules that 
govern their invocation. As such, these rules and the Commission’s treatment of them have been of 
greater importance for the Member States derogation possibilities under these two provisions. 
 
3.1.1.2 Procedural rules 
Recourse to the safeguard clause in Article 23 requires the Member State to immediately notify the 
Commission and other Member States of its actions. In addition it has to motivate its decision and 
present a reviewed environmental risk assessment, indicating if and how the conditions of the 
authorisation should be amended or terminated.152  
 
Similarly, employing emergency measures under Article 34 FFR also demands that Member States 
make its actions known to the Commission and other Member States.153 The CJEU has made it 
clear that notification is to take place and the information about the content of the measures has to 
be provided as soon as possible when there is a need to take emergency measures.154  
 
After the information has been forwarded the Union control procedure takes place. It was 
mentioned above in 3.1, that Article 114.10 TFEU permits for harmonised measures to include 
safeguard clauses of a provisional nature. Accordingly, Article 23 of the Deliberate Release Directive 
states that Member States may “provisionally” invoke safeguard measures.155 Likewise, Article 34 of 
the FFR allows for “interim protective measures”.156 As also stated in the Treaty article, these 
provisional measures are to be governed by a Union control procedure.157 This procedure, which is 
also governed by Comitology rules, bares resemblance to the one in the authorisation process.    
 
The procedure governing safeguard measures taken under Article 23 is the following. After the 
Member State has forwarded its information about the safeguard measure, the Commission has 60 
                                                 
151 Ibid, para 110-114. In relation to emergency measures, see Case C-58/10 to C-68/10,  Monsanto (France), para 71. 
152 Article 23.1(3) Deliberate Release Directive. 
153 By reference to Articles 53 and 54 Regulation 178/2002.   
154 Case C-58/10 to C-68/10, Monsanto (France), para 72-73. 
155 Article 23.1(1) Deliberate Release Directive. The measure is to be provisional but effective immediately upon 
notification to the Commission.  
156 Article 34 FFR by reference to Article 54 Regulation 178/2002. 
157 Article 114.10 TFEU. 
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days to make a draft decision on the restrictive measures.158 During this time the Commission shall 
consult the EFSA regarding the Member State’s scientific evidence. Upon this, the draft approving 
or rejecting decision is handed over to the Scientific Committee, which has 90 days to provide an 
opinion by QM. If the safeguard measure is in line with the Scientific Committee’s opinion, the 
measures shall be approved and adopted by the Commission.  In case the scientific opinion is 
unsupportive of the Member State’s stance, or when an opinion is not provided, the measure is up 
to the Council to decide upon. As with the Scientific Committee, the Council has 90 days to find a 
QM, this time to adopt or reject the safeguard measure. If the Member States’ representatives 
cannot reach the necessary majority in the Council the safeguard measure is to be decided upon by 
the Commission.159  
 
The control procedure in relation to Article 34 is very much alike the one just described. One 
notable difference is that consultation with the EFSA regarding the Member State’s scientific 
evidence is not mandatory. Furthermore, due to the “urgency” of emergency measures, the 
Commission submits its draft decision within only ten days after notification from the Member 
State. This is then followed by the same procedure as for safeguard measures.160 
 
With this examination of how the two provisions are to be used in “theory” in mind, we now turn 
to Member States’ use of Article 23 of the Deliberate Release Directive and Article 34 of the FFR in 
practice. 
 
3.1.2 Article 23 Deliberate Release Directive and Article 34 
FFR – in practice 
In practice several Member States have made use of the opt out possibilities offered by these two 
provisions to restrict or completely ban cultivation of GM crops in their respective territories.161  
 
A handful of Member States have made recourse to the safeguard clause in Article 23, with a 
number of national and regional bans on GMOs authorised for cultivation purposes currently in 
place.162 Bans on the use for cultivation purposes have since the Deliberate Release Directive came 
in place concerned the GM maize varieties MON810 and T25,163 and the Amflora Potato. It should 
be reiterated, though that MON810 is the only GM crop that is currently cultivated for commercial 
purposes.  
 
Article 34 of the FFR has thus far when it comes to cultivation, only been used in relation to 
MON810. It was stated earlier164 that safeguard measures under Article 23 are not applicable in case 
the authorisation of the GMO was granted under the FFR. This has had practical implications since 
the renewal of the authorisation of MON810 was submitted under the latter. Therefore, since early 
                                                 
158 Articles 23.2 and 30.2 Deliberate Release Directive and Article 5 Comitology Decision 1999/468/EC.  
159 Article 5.6 Comitology Decision 1999/468/EC.  
160 Article 34 FFR and Articles 54, 58.1-2 Regulation 178/2002 by reference to Article 5 Comitology Decision 
1999/468/EC. 
161 For an overview that also covers more restrictions on GMOs than cultivation, see The Farmers Scientist Network, 
Europe: GM crop cultivation and bans: http://greenbiotech.eu/eu-gm-crops/ 
162 Note that recourse has been made to Article 23 Deliberate Release Directive also outside the context of restricting 
cultivation of GMOs. See ibid and Hristova, 2013, p. 116.  
163 T25 never came to be marketed by their company for cultivation purposes, Hristova, 2013, p. 113.  
164 See chapter 3.1 
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2007 notifications regarding national measures restricting or prohibiting cultivation of this specific 
GM crop have been viewed against Article 34.165 
 
As will be demonstrated next, Member States has had a hard time convincing the EFSA and the 
Commission that they meet the substantive conditions in these two articles. 
 
3.1.2.1 Fulfilling the substantive conditions in practice 
We begin by considering invocation of Article 23 of the Deliberate Release.  
 
Austria166 twice invoked the Article 16 of the old Deliberate Release Directive to provisionally 
prohibit cultivation of the authorised GM maize variants MON810 and T25 respectively. By the 
time the new regime was in place, Austria was asked by the Commission to reconsider its position 
and Austria provided additional information for their measures to be adopted under Article 23. The 
EFSA concluded in their scientific opinion in 2008 that there was no new evidence in terms of risk 
to human health and the environment suggesting that the previous risk assessments in the 
authorisation procedure should be invalidated.167 The same answer was given by the EFSA on the 
evidence provided by Austria in 2010 with regards to the Amflora Potato.168 
 
Likewise, Luxemburg,169 Hungary170 and Greece171 have invoked Article 23 to ban cultivation within 
their territories. For Luxemburg the ban concerned the Amflora Potato. For Hungary the bans have 
concerned the Amflora Potato and MON810, and for Greece only the latter. As was the case for 
Austria, neither one of these Member States managed to convince the EFSA with their scientific 
evidence.172 However, all restrictions remain in place. 
 
Regarding emergency measures a total of three Member States - France, Luxemburg and Italy -have 
invoked Article 34 in order to ban cultivation of MON810.  
 
The most recent emergency measure was adopted by Italy.173 In March 2013 Italy notified and 
provided the Commission with scientific evidence in support of its coming prohibition. By July the 
same year the ban was put in place by a national decree.  The EFSA was soon requested by the 
Commission to evaluate the documentation provided by Italy.  The EFSA held in the end of 2013 
that there was “no specific scientific evidence, in terms of risk to human and animal health or the 
environment” supporting the notification of an emergency measure that would “invalidate the 
EFSA’s previous risk assessments of the GM maize in question”.174 This national ban on MON810 
is still in effect.  
 
                                                 
165 Commission. Evaluation of the EU legislative framework in the field of GM food and feed. Final Report 2010, p. 82. 
166 The Farmers Scientist Network, Austria: http://greenbiotech.eu/eu-gm-crops/austria/ 
167 EFSA, (891) 2008, p.1-2.  
168 EFSA, (2627) 2012, p. 3. 
169 The Farmers Scientist Network, Luxemburg: http://greenbiotech.eu/eu-gm-crops/luxemburg/ 
170 The Farmers Scientist Network, Hungary:  http://greenbiotech.eu/eu-gm-crops/hungary/ 
171 The Farmers Scientist Network, Greece http://greenbiotech.eu/eu-gm-crops/greece/ 
172 Regarding Luxemburg, EFSA,(2874) 2012; Regarding Hungary, EFSA, (756) 2008; Regarding Greece, EFSA, (757) 
2008.  
173 The Farmers Scientist Network, Italy: http://greenbiotech.eu/eu-gm-crops/italy/ 
174 EFSA, (3371) 2013- 
 27 
Luxemburg175 prohibited cultivation of the MON810 in 2009. By 2012 its scientific argumentation 
in supporting the measures was submitted to the Commission. The scientific evidence subsequently 
came under the scrutiny of the EFSA, which reached the same conclusion as it did on the Italian 
evidence. It also added that Luxemburg’s remaining concerns related to socioeconomic aspects of 
coexistence and thus fell outside its remits.176 This ban also remains in place.  
 
France177 has twice turned to emergency measures to ban cultivation of MON810 by invoking 
Article 34. Apart from the EFSA reaching the same conclusion regarding the provided evidence,178 
it is notable that France ignored the procedural rules, as it did not inform the Commission prior to 
its adoption of the measures. The first French ban was in place until 2013 when it was annulled by 
the Conseil d’Etat,179 in the aftermath of the preliminary ruling in Monsanto (France). The second 
one remains in place. 
 
This brief overview shows that these Member States have invariably been unable to convince the 
EFSA that the substantive requirements and their evidential thresholds have been fulfilled. The 
EFSA has consistently held that no scientific evidence has been forwarded regarding risk to health 
or the environment so as to invalidate its previous risk assessments of the GM crop in question. 
Notably, in practice no precautionary relaxation of Member States’ evidentiary burden has been 
afforded the Member States relying on these two provisions when restricting GM agriculture.  
 
However, all bans under Article 23 concerning MON810 remain in place today.180 The same goes 
for most of the bans under Article 34. The explanation of this is found in the procedural reality 
surrounding these two provisions. We will now turn to the practical procedural interplay between 
the Commission, the EFSA the Member States’ representatives in the Council in these cases. This is 
of importance to understand the actual scope and reality of derogating under these provisions. In 
addition it shows how the provisions have arguably been misused by Member States against the will 
of the Commission. 
 
3.1.2.2 The procedural reality  
 
The practical pattern of the control procedure when it comes to Member States prohibiting 
cultivation under these two provisions reveals some interesting insights in terms of understanding 
their potential scope.  
 
To begin with, as shown by the review above, the Commission has invariably consulted the EFSA 
for a scientific opinion on the documentation provided by the Member States in support of their 
measures. This has been the case also under Article 34 of the FFR when such requests from the 
Commission are not mandatory.  
 
Furthermore, according to the control procedure described in 3.1.1.1, the Commission is to deliver 
a draft proposal on the restrictive measures and forward it to the Scientific Committee for an 
opinion. The draft proposal is to be submitted within 60 or 10 days depending on the measure. 
                                                 
175 The Farmers Scientist Network, Luxemburg: http://greenbiotech.eu/eu-gm-crops/luxemburg/ 
176 EFSA, (3372) 2013.  
177 The Farmers Scientist Network, France: http://greenbiotech.eu/eu-gm-crops/france/ 
178 EFSA, (2705) 2012. 
179 The highest administrative court in France. 
180 As stated earlier, T25 and the Amflora Potato are no longer authorised for cultivation. 
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However, this was not done by the Commission concerning the emergency measures taken by Italy 
and Luxemburg.181 These measures remain unchallenged by the Commission, and, as stated above, 
are still in place. Somewhat lax approaches to the procedural rules seem to have been the case for 
both the Commission and the Member States. With regards to the Member States, France’s 
omission to inform the Commission in advance of its adoption of its measures is one example. 
Others include mere translations of scientific evidence handed in by other Member States that have 
earlier been rejected.182 Notably, at the time of adoption of the Italian decree under Article 34 the 
Italian Ministry of Agriculture held that the Italian measure could be inconsistent with EU law, but 
that based on earlier experience it was unlikely that the Commission would open an infringement 
procedure.183  
 
Regarding Article 23 measures, the Commission has repeatedly sought to overturn the bans by 
drawing on the EFSA’s conclusions.184  As the EFSA has found no risk to health or the 
environment, the Commission has simply held that the measures ought to be repealed.185 This 
suggests that the Commission has put great trust in the EFSA findings and that it has not wanted 
the internal market to be fragmented needlessly.  
 
However, the Commission’s proposals for upheaval of these measures have constantly met 
opposition in the Council. As opposed to when it comes to authorisation decisions, the Council has 
not had problems with reaching QM186 in favour of the cultivation bans.187 Hence, enough Member 
States seem to agree that the Commission should not be entitled to lift the restrictive measures 
against the will and concerns of the Member State and its citizens.188  
 
It has been stated in evaluations of the GMO regime that there has been a general understanding 
between Member States that the use of national safeguard and emergency measures, while presented 
as having a scientific justification, has instead at times been expressions of “frustrations with the 
current risk assessment practice, of non-scientific objections to GMO cultivation and of political 
circumstances”.189 One example here is Luxemburg’s reference to the socioeconomic impact of GM 
cultivation which was held to fall outside the scope of the safeguard clause. 
 
 As Member States’ restrictions based on the provisions have been kept contrary to the EFSA’s 
                                                 
181 See The Farmers Scientist Network, Italy:  http://greenbiotech.eu/eu-gm-crops/italy/and The Farmers Scientist 
Network, Luxemburg: http://greenbiotech.eu/eu-gm-crops/luxemburg/  
182 The scientific information provided by Italy under Article 34 has been held to have been a ”simple translation of the 
scientific dossier submitted by France”, The Farmers Scientist Network, Italy:  http://greenbiotech.eu/eu-gm-
crops/italy/ 
183 See ibid. 
184 See e.g, Commission, COM (2009) 56 final. 
185 See e.g., ibid, para 22 and Commission, COM (2009) 12 final, para 10.  
186 The Council has only failed to reach a qualified majority in two cases on safeguard bans. Both with regards to 
Austrian bans and these have not been concerned with GMOs for cultivation purposes. See Geelhoed, 2014, p. 12. On 
this note Zurek holds that the accession to the EU of more Eastern European states, where traditional and organic 
agriculture remain of great economic and social importance, has resulted in a power-shift, strengthening the opposition 
against GMOs considerably, Zurek 2011, p. 241.  
187 The logic behind this seems to differ between Member States.  Even if being pro-GMO, some Member States’ 
representatives in the Council have voted against the Commission’s repealing proposals because they believe Member 
States should have the capacity to impose restrictions on their territories. As such, this group of countries vote for 
preserving national competences rather than on substantive grounds concerning the actual safety of the crop in 
question,  Pollack and Schaffer 2010, p. 352 and Hristova, 2013, p. 116f. The latter also concludes that Member States 
that have wished to keep their bans have actively lobbied other Member States to secure QM against Commission 
proposals. 
188 Weimer 2014, p. 7. 
189 Commission, EPEC  Final Report, 2011, p. 52.  
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scientific opinions and the Commission’s proposals, it is possible to conclude that the practical use 
of safeguard measures have partly reflected Member States’ non-scientific considerations and partly 
because of dismay with the centralised risk assessments. As for the latter, the Council held on the 
Hungarian measure that the assessments fail to systematically take into account the diversity of 
agricultural structures and ecological characteristics of the Member States in the EU.190 
 
The quite stringent interpretations of the substantive conditions thus have had little practical 
implications as the procedural rules have de facto helped Member States to maintain national 
discretion on cultivation of GM crops. Alternatively, the Commission has not taken action pursuant 
to notifications.  
 
However, the appropriateness and pratice of invoking these measures against cultivation of GM 
crops is questionable. For one thing, with basically all national measures on the MON810 still in 
place, the “provisional” nature of them is debatable, as some have been in place for quite some 
time. Furthermore, in theory, rather than being used to accommodate national differences, Article 
23 and, especially Article 34 are intended for situations of emergency and crisis where prompt 
action is needed to prevent harm to human health or the environment.191  As for Article 34 it was 
incorporated in the FFR with emergencies such as the “mad cow disease” and “Creutzfeld-Jakob 
disease” in mind. Therefore it is not surprising that the aptness of Member States’ use of the article 
in relation to GM cultivation has been questioned. And arguably, the idea of an “emergency” does 
not fit well with the scientific arguments used by for instance France, when referring to 
uncertainties over long term impacts of the MON810.192   
 
It may be concluded that the limited theoretical scope to invoke environmental and health concerns 
towards specific GM crops under these two provision in the GMO legislation has thus far not had 
practical limiting effects. This is so due to the procedural rules and somewhat lax approach from the 
Commission regarding emergency measures. It is also clear that emergency and safeguard measures 
have not been used as intended. In any case, it remains to be seen how this practice will develop in 
light of the new possibilities offered under Article 26b.  As will be shown in chapter 4, it is unclear 
to what extent the possibilities to invoke environmental concerns will increase in the future. 
However, at least it should be able to better accommodate non-safety concerns.  
 
Next we turn to the derogation possibilities offered by Article 114.5 TFEU. As with the just 
examined provisions, this so called “environmental guarantee” is also concerned safety concerns. 
However, as potentially having more restrictive and general effects on GM cultivation – and in turn 
on the internal market-, its substantive conditions are and have been interpreted even stricter. 
3.2 Under Article 114.5 TFEU – general measures on 
GMOs 
Article 114 TFEU does not only provide for safeguard clauses in secondary EU law. It also provides 
an alternative route for banning cultivation of authorised GM crops on grounds related to 
environmental protection. Whereas the provisions in the GMO-legislation (in theory) only permit 
                                                 
190 See e.g., COUNCIL. 2785th Council meeting, 6272/07 (Presse 25), 20 February 2007. 
 
191 Hristova, 2013, p. 117. 
192 Commission. Evaluation of the EU legislative framework in the field of GM food and feed. Final Report 2010, p. 81f. 
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provisional bans on a case-by-case basis, Article 114.5 TFEU allows for permanent and general opt 
outs from the harmonisation provided by the authorisation procedure in the Deliberate Release 
Directive and the FFR. However, as will be demonstrated, in the very limited number of cases that 
Member States have sought to rely on this provision in relation to GMOs it has shown to provide 
limited scope for autonomy.  
 
Article 114.5 states that:  
[…] if, after the adoption of a harmonisation measure […] a Member State deems it necessary to 
introduce national provisions based on new scientific evidence relating to the protection of the 
environment or the working environment on grounds of a problem specific to that Member State arising after 
the adoption of the harmonisation measure, it shall notify the Commission of the envisaged 
provisions as well as the grounds for introducing them.193  
 
The provision contains five cumulative substantive conditions,194 which must all be fulfilled for the 
national measure to be accepted. The essence of these, are that it is for the Member State in 
question to demonstrate on the basis of new scientific evidence that the level of protection for the 
(working) environment) afforded by the harmonising measure, i.e. the Deliberate Release Directive 
and the FFR, was not acceptable having regard to a problem specific to that Member State which 
arose after the adoption of these legislative acts.195 
 
The protected interests of Article 114.5 are the environment and the working environment. This 
can be compared with Article 114.4 TFEU,196 which allows Member States to invoke any of the 
grounds of Article 36 TFEU when maintaining stricter national measures. The logic of this limited197 
number of grounds that can be invoked is that new national measures are more likely to threaten 
harmonisation, than keeping existing measures that will already have been taken intro account in the 
harmonisation. As such, it is in line with the EU’s restrained attitude towards giving Member States 
too much manoeuvrability to derogate from harmonised rules.198  
 
Furthermore, the notification requirement explicit in Article 114.5 means that national measures 
must be notified to the Commission, and that they are not effective until the Commission has 
accepted them. The Commission has six months to approve or reject the national measures after 
assessing if they are a means of arbitrary discrimination, disguised trade restrictions or constitute an 
obstacle to the functioning of the internal market.199 This timeframe can be extended in complex of 
cases.200 Article 114.6(2) holds that in the absence of a decision form the Commission within the 
time limit, the national measure shall be deemed to have been approved, whereby it can take effect.  
 
It is worth mentioning here that Portugal managed to get a cultivation ban on the island of Madeira 
approved in this way. Portugal’s evidence relating to environmental protection was considered 
                                                 
193 My italics.  
194 Joined cases C-439/05 P and C-454/05 P, Land Oberösterreich and Republic of Austria v Commission,  para 58-59.  
195 Cf., Case C-3/00, Kingdom of Denmark v Commission, para 57. 
196 This article is not of immediate relevance to this thesis since national measures on GMOs have so far been dealt with 
as new measures under Article 114.5. 
197 Article 36 TFEU allows for invocation of grounds of for example public morality, public policy, the protection of 
health and life of humans, animals or plants. See below in chapter 4.3 where these grounds can be used in the context of 
non-harmonised areas. 
198 Case C-512/99, Federal Republic of Germany v Commission, para, 41; Lee 2008, p. 93. 
199 See Article 114.6 TFEU.  These conditions that essentially have to do with proportionality will be examined in 
Chapter 4 as they are of relevance also for the new Article 26b. It could be argued that they are  not of much relevance 
in the context of GMOs and Article 114.5 as national measures have not been able to pass the cumulative conditions.  
200 Article 114.6(3) TFEU.  
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complicated, whereby the Commission found an EFSA opinion on the scientific risk assessment 
necessary and extended its decision period.201 However, no decision was given within the extended 
timeframe, notwithstanding a conclusion by the EFSA that the provided evidence was insufficient 
to justify a prohibition on GM cultivation  in Madeira.202 This tacit approval is likely to have been 
the result of that  the Commission was soon to present its proposal on the new Article 26b.  
 
The cumulative substantive conditions that are italicized above act very restrictive on Member 
States possibilities to act pursuant to this provision. This is especially so for what amounts to new 
scientific evidence and a problem specific to a Member State. These are the so-called “novelty” and 
“specificity” conditions. In addition, the legitimate grounds for concern limit Member States 
justification grounds in the context of GM cultivation. This is all evidenced by a closer look on the 
how they have been treated by the EFSA, the Commission’s and the EU courts. 
3.2.1 Substantive conditions  
The joined Cases C-439/05 P and C-454/05 P, Land Oberösterreich,203 provide the main backdrop 
against which the substantive conditions of Article 114.5 are examined here.   
 
In this case Austria notified the Commission of its plans to adopt an act banning all uses – including 
cultivation - of GMOs in the Land Oberösterreich region in derogation of the Deliberate Release 
Directive. Austria held that its measures aimed at protecting the natural environment’s biodiversity. 
It also put forward that the act aimed at keeping the region’s small-structured and mainly organic 
farming systems GM free, which it held would be practically impossible alongside GM cultivation in 
the long term and further worsen environmental impacts. Under these premises Austria held that 
general GMO restrictions were justified.204 However, these claims were rejected by the Commission 
on the ground of failure to provide new scientific evidence or demonstrate that a problem specific 
in the region had arisen following the adoption of the Deliberate Release Directive. The Austrian 
measure was subsequently rejected also by the CFI,205 as well as by the ECJ. 
 
3.2.1.1 “New scientific evidence” – novelty 
 
The novelty requirement of Article 114.5 holds that the national measure must be based on “new 
scientific evidence”. The meaning of the requirement was up for interpretation in the case before 
us.  
 
As evidence in support of their measures, Austria relied on a report that was published after the 
adoption of the Deliberate Release Directive. The report pointed towards long term negative 
impacts of GM crops on naturally occurring crop formations and GM free agricultural production. 
After requesting the EFSA’s opinion, the Commission rejected the report as the data it included 
“were for a large part available prior to the adoption” of the Union measure. The Commission 
rejected an argument put forward by Austria that the report it relied on was released almost a year 
                                                 
201 Commission,  Decision 2009/828/EC, para 21-22.  
202 EFSA, (1500) 2010. 
203 Joined cases C-439/05 P and C-454/05 P, Land Oberösterreich and Republic of Austria v Commission. Hereafter 
“Land Oberösterreich”. 
204 Commission,  Decision 2003/653/EC, para  31-36.  
205 Joined Cases T-366/03 and T-235/04, Land Oberösterreich and Republic of Austria v Commission. Hereafter “Land 
Oberösterreich”. 
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after the adoption of the Deliberate Release Directive, as most of the sources it referred to “were 
published prior to the adoption” of the directive.206  
 
This issue never came under the test of the ECJ as the appeal was rejected on the grounds of there 
being a lack of a specific problem.207 However, the Commission’s stance is in line with previous case 
law on what amounts to new evidence.208 AG Sharpston’s opinion, can serve to illustrate the 
implications of this approach to newness. Her view was that “new conclusions drawn from existing 
data may constitute new scientific evidence” within the meaning of the article.209   
 
An approach similar to the AG’s on new evidence has not been pursued by the Union courts. 
Hence, there  is a demand of new data under the provision, whereby evidence that existed before 
the EU adopted its harmonised measure, but was not taken into account is excluded. This means 
that it does not seem to be possible to reassess previous data with “new glasses” that may throw 
new light on the nature or degree of risk to the environment. Instead new evidence is literally 
required. This is also in itself a stricter approach than under Article 23 of the Deliberate Release 
Directive,210 under which Member States have also not been able to satisfy the evidentiary demands. 
 
3.2.1.2 “Problem specific to the Member State” – specificity 
 
Article 114.5 furthermore states that the new evidence shows an environmental problem specific to 
the Member State, arising after the adoption of the harmonisation measure.  
 
In Land Oberösterreich Austria fruitlessly argued, and that its “small-structured farming systems” were 
specific to the region in question. By leaning on the opinion of EFSA, the Commission held that 
the scientific evidence did not suggest anything else than that such systems exist in every Member 
State. Therefore they were “certainly” not specific to this region.  Furthermore, Austria had not 
provided scientific evidence establishing that the area in question had “unusual or unique 
ecosystems”, necessitating distinct risk assessments from those conducted for the country as a 
whole, or for similar areas of the EU.211 
 
Both the CFI and the ECJ were of the same opinion regarding the specificity. They quite shortly 
stated that there was no scientific evidence in the report demonstrating the existence of a specific 
problem.212  
 
The ECJ also stated that the requirement is not that the problem needs to be “unique” to the 
Member State, but that it should be “specific”.213 The meaning of this was not further defined by 
                                                 
206 Commission,  Decision 2003/653/EC, para 65. The CFI did not go into detail regarding this, other this requirement, 
see  Joined Cases T-366/03 and T-235/04, Land Oberösterreich, para 65f. 
207 Ibid, para 63-64. 
208 See Lee 2008, p. 94 with reference to Joined cases T-74/00, T-76/00, T-83/00 to T-85/00, T-132/00, T-137/00 and 
T-141/00, Artegodan GmbH and Others v Commission, para 194.  
209 Opinion of AG Sharpston – Joined Cases C-439/05 P and C-454/05 P, para 124.  
210 Article 23 Deliberate Release Directive allows for new interpretation of earlier data. 
211 Commission,  Decision 2003/653/EC, para 70-71. 
212 Joined Cases T-366/03 and T-235/04, Land Oberösterreich, para 65-68; Joined cases C-439/05 P and C-454/05 P, 
Land Oberösterreich,  para 61-64. 
213 Joined cases C-439/05 P and C-454/05 P, Land Oberösterreich, para 65-68. 
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the ECJ. However, AG Sharpston held in her opinion that a specific problem is located somewhere 
between a unique one and one that is “common, generalised or widespread”.214  
 
The specificity requirement was elaborated with by the CFI in another case the same year, but in the 
context of air pollution. Apart from stating that the problem does not need to be unique to the 
Member State,215 the CFI held that that the problem in question needs to be “so acute as to 
distinguish them significantly from those observed in other Member States”.216 This judgment 
treated specificity in relation to harmonisation. The CFI held that the issue of a specific problem 
relates in particular to “cases where a new phenomenon arises in all or part of a Member State’s 
territory, which has negative effects on the environment and which could not be taken into account 
in the preparation of the harmonised rules”.217 Drawing on this it stated that a problem that arises 
which on the whole is comparable to those of other Member Stats lends itself to harmonised 
solutions at the EU level, is to be seen as “general in nature” and does not constitute a specific one. 
Thus, it held that national specificity of a problem is essentially to be envisaged “from the angle of 
the aptness or inaptness of the harmonisation of the applicable [EU measure]” to adequately 
confront difficulties encountered locally, “since the established inaptness of those rules justify the 
introduction of national measures”.218 
 
It is however still not very clear as to what exactly amounts to a specific problem. But it is not a wild 
guess that it takes substantial effort to convince the Commission and the CJEU that the GMO 
regime does not take into account regional and local environmental aspects, as the Commission 
continuously states that such aspects are taken into account in the central risk assessments.219 
 
3.2.1.3 Protection of  the (working) environment  
 
Furthermore the only interests that a Member State can legitimately pursue under Article 114.5 are 
the protection of the environment or the working environment.220  As stated above Austria held in 
Land Oberösterreich that the general ban was justified in light of the impossibilities for GM cultivation 
to coexist with the region’s own organic agriculture. The argument was that extensive use of GM 
farming would result in contamination and in the long run displace GM-free agriculture.221  
 
The Commission, drew on the EFSA’s conclusions and held that no evidence was presented in the 
Austria’s report “to show that coexistence is an environmental or human health risk issue”. Instead 
the Commission was of the opinion that Austria’s concerns of avoiding negative impacts on its 
organic farming from GM crops related more to concerns of a socioeconomic character.222  
Consequently, Austria’s concerns in this regard were held to fall outside the scope of the article.223  
 
                                                 
214 Opinion of AG Sharpston – Joined Cases C-439/05 P and C-454/05 P, para 110. 
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Whereas the issue of coexistence will be dealt with more thoroughly just below, it can be stated 
already now that this approach from the Commission has been criticised. Lee holds that this 
understanding of the values of organic farming is “contentiously narrow”, as it neglects its 
environmental merits.224 What she means seems to be that organic farming comes along with 
benefits for biodiversity and that in that sense, protecting organic farming could be interpreted as 
“environmental protection”. Indeed there are studies that point to the environmental benefits from 
organic farming compared to other methods.225 While this is not the place for a normative analysis, 
this shows that not all considerations that by some are considered to fall in under the scope do so. 
In this context however, coexistence has been addressed in Article 26a of the Deliberate Release 
Directive and the possbile insufficiencies of such measures in the new Article 26b.  
 
It has now been demonstrated that the scope for derogating under Article 114.5 is limited by the 
substantive conditions of the article and the strict interpretations made by the central Union 
institutions. As opposed to the opt out possibilities afforded under Article 23 of the Deliberate 
Release Directive and Article 34 FFR there is not really any procedural safety net for Member States 
to rely on. This is in sharp contrast to the procedure governing safeguard and emergency measures 
as under Article 114.5 the Member States are not represented in comitology. Instead the 
Commission has the final saying, subject to review of the Courts. 
 
What happened in the Portugal case is very likely to be a one-time incident on behalf of the 
Commission.  Together this probably goes a long way in explaining why the “environmental 
guarantee” clauses has been invoked so few times by Member States in comparison to the earlier 
examined provisions also concerned with safety issues.  
 
Moreover, it was mentioned in passing that the Commission, and ultimately the CJEU, are to assess 
if the restriction are means of arbitrary discrimination, disguised trade restrictions or constitute an 
obstacle to the functioning of the internal market. These typical internal market restrictions are 
explicit in Article 114.6 and have to do with proportionality..226 As is obvious from the Land 
Oberösterreich case these tests were not undertaken as the other substantive conditions were not 
fulfilled.  Nonetheless, these controls are of great importance to Member States’ derogation 
possibilities in general (and apply equally to coexistence measures) and are elaborated with in 
chapter 4 in the context of the new Article 26b.  
 
Before we move on to the new derogation possibilities however, we look a little closer at the issue 
of coexistence, which is explicitly addressed and de-harmonised  in the Deliberate Release Directive. 
3.3 Coexistence measures – Article 26a Deliberate 
Release Directive 
Apart from the original “scientific” opt out possibilities explored above, coexistence measures offer 
another, leaner way out of GM cultivation for Member States, as this mechanism is intended to 
target local and individual situations rather than providing for national prohibitions.227  Yet, 
coexistence measures have an important role to play for Member States and in this thesis, as they 
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potentially offer a way out of GM cultivation for different reasons than the science-based 
provisions.228 Certain economic risks of GM agriculture have since the second framework came into 
place expressly been left outside the scope of the harmonisation of the GMO regime. As such these 
concerns have been allowed to be regulated on Member State level through coexistence measures 
under the conditions that apply to these.  
 
This chapter briefly demonstrates how the concept of coexistence is subject to a largely economical 
logic and limitations of general EU law requirements such as proportionality. However, the 
Commission has not challenged any national coexistence measures, whereby their actual use is likely 
to exceed their intended one.  
3.3.1 Introduction 
The coexistence provision is found in Article 26a of the Deliberate Release Directive.229 According 
to that article “Member States may take appropriate measures to avoid the unintended presence of 
GMOs in other products”.230  This applies in particular to avoiding the presence of GMOs in other 
crops, such as conventional or organic ones.231  
 
As indicated from the article itself, the concept of coexistence is based on the recognition that 
cultivation of GM crops may have consequences for conventional and organic agriculture and vice 
versa due the possibility of adventitious mixture of crops.232 In line with this, coexistence measures 
are envisioned to smoothen harmonious cultivation of these three agritypes, without excluding any 
of them.  
 
Article 26a foresees that national coexistence measures should be coordinated by the Commission. 
Hence, the Commission has provided guidelines at two times, in 2003 and 2010, to provide 
guidance to the Member States in implementing appropriate measures under the article.233 Notably 
the 2010 guidelines were issued at the same time as the Commission’s proposal on the new Article 
26b, which might explain their somewhat more flexible approach in comparison to the older ones’.  
 
According to the guidelines, coexistence is the idea that famers should be able to choose between 
conventional, organic and GM-crop production in practice..234 The idea is to allow Member States 
to set up binding or non-binding good practices of isolation in order to guarantee farmers’ right of 
choice and compliance with labelling and traceability standards set out in the GMO framework.235  
 
Measures to ensure coexistence of different forms of agriculture include technical measures, such as  
weed management and careful cleaning and maintenance of equipment. Another common measure 
                                                 
228 Moreover, in practice, more than half of the Member States have at some point adopted coexistence legislation to 
limit or prevent the presence of GMOs within non-GM crops. 
229 The insertion of the Article 26a into the Deliberate Release Diretive  in 2003 was an attempt to lift the bans and the 
moratorium under the Old Deliberate Release Directive, see Dobbs 2011, p. 181. 
230 Article 26a.1 Deliberate Release Directive. 
231 Recital 1. Commission  Recommendation  2010/C 200/01. 
232 Commission Recommendation  2003/556/EC, para 1.1. 
233 In 2003 the Commission Recommendation  2003/556/EC and in 2010 the  Commission  Recommendation  2010/C 
200/01. 
234Recital 3 Commission  Recommendation  2003/556/EC. 
235 Varela 2010 p. 353. 
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is that Member States prescribe a fixed buffer-zone of up to a few hundred meters between GM 
crop fields and fields where conventional or organic crops are grown.236  
 
Whereas the technical measures are of lesser importance in the view of actually restricting GM 
cultivation, it should be pointed out that the 2010 Guidelines introduced the concept of “GM-free 
areas”. This permits Member States to exclude GMO cultivation from larger areas under certain 
economic and natural conditions to avoid unintended GMO presence.237 As such, these buffer and 
GM free zones can be of various scales and are the strictest of the legal coexistence measures in 
light of the Commission’s guidelines.238 
 
3.3.2 The logic of coexistence 
The logic of coexistence under Article 26a is largely economical. The Commission has held that 
admixture of GM crops and conventional or organic ones might amount to potential economical 
losses and impacts for farmers, for example through the possibility of losing organic certification 
due to unintended presence of GMOs for organic farmers.239 This is to be understood in light of the 
0.9 % threshold in the GMO legislation that requires farmers to label their products as containing 
GMOs if the threshold is altered.240 If measures are not adopted to avoid admixture above that 
threshold, farmers’ investments in keeping crops organic or traditional may be seriously affected as 
economic benefits from being able to advertise their products as GMO-free are lost.  
 
The Commission’s guidelines underline the importance of making a “clear distinction between the 
economic aspects of GMO cultivation and the environmental risk assessment aspect dealt with 
under the authorisation procedure”. Since only authorised GMOs can be cultivated in the Union 
and the environmental and health aspects are already covered by the environmental risk assessment 
of the authorisation process, “the pending issues still to be addressed in the context of co-existence 
concern the economic aspects associated with the admixture of GM and non-GM crops”.241 
 
3.3.3 The limitations and control of coexistence measures 
In the 2003 guidelines GMO-free and GMO exclusive productions zones could only be established 
by private agreements between farmers, which proved to be difficult in practice. This “highly 
restrictive approach” did not allow for any larger areas to be GM free.242 As such, the 2010 
guidelines which were issued together in a package with the Commissions proposal on the new 
Article 26b, are somewhat more permitting. This is so for example in regards to the 0.9% threshold. 
Although Member States can still not eliminate cultivation of GM crops in their whole territory by 
relying on this provision.243 The discretion that Member States are allowed under Article 26a is 
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subject to a number of limitations. 
 
To begin with, the economical understanding of the article sets limitations, as Member States 
cannot invoke other grounds than these specific socioeconomical ones. Focusing on the economical 
implications of coexistence, not only excludes environmental and health protection, but also other 
aspects like consumer protection, ethics and cultural traditions when Member States adopt measures 
under the provision.244  
 
Next, by being outside the harmonised scope of the GMO regime coexistence measures are subject 
to general rules of internal market law.245 Specifically, it is likely that any GM free zone will need to 
be justified under Article 36 of the TFEU or the mandatory requirements246 and already the wording 
“appropriate” in the article suggests that the measures have to be proportional. This is also made 
clear in the in the 2010 Guidelines, where measures on large areas are to be “proportionate to the 
objective pursued” and necessity needs to be demonstrated by the Member State in the sense that  
“other measures are not sufficient to prevent the unintended presence of GMOs in conventional or 
organic crops”.247 Thus while the Commission recognises that “appropriate” restrictions could 
involve GM-free areas all measures need to be proportionate to the protection of the needs of the 
farmer, which would normally only require the determination of the above-mentioned isolation 
distances.248  
 
These limitations are more thoroughly addressed in Chapter 4.3. What can be said here is that 
national coexistence measures have sometimes taken extreme forms.  In some European regions 
full prohibitions to plant GM crops have been enacted. These bans have been based on agronomic 
justifications, political and economic reasons, for instance meeting the market demands for GM-
free products or the need to preserve biodiversity and the natural environment in general.249 Not 
surprisingly some of these restrictions have been considered legally questionable.250  
 
Notwithstanding this, and that a majority of the Member States have enacted coexistence measures, 
the Union courts have not yet ruled on the legality of any of them in light of the limitations yet, as 
none have been challenged by the Commission for infringement of EU law.251 Notably, the 
Commission has put the issue aside, holding that the relatively small effects of the measures 
prevents them from hindering trade.252 However, on a preliminary reference it was held by the 
CJEU that Article 26a allows for coexistence measures that give rise to restrictions, but not to 
general bans on GM cultivation.253  
 
As such the scope to avoid unintended contamination under Article 26a is limited, but it is possible 
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that the controls of these restrictions will continue to be weak in relation to GM-reluctant Member 
States. Mainly since they have the new opt out clause in Article 26b to base restrictive measures 
on.254 
3.4 Concluding remarks on the original opt out 
possibilites 
This chapter has sought to examine the Member States’ original possibilities to restrict or prohibit 
cultivation of authorised GM crops in their respective territories. In doing so the  
provisions in Article 23 of the Deliberate Release Directive and Article 34 of the FFR and Article 
114.5 TFEU were examined. Additionally, coexistence measures, which are allowed for under 
Article 26a of the Deliberate Release Directive, were treated.  
 
Regarding the first three of these original provisions it has been shown that they share common 
ground in that they are all concerned with safety, i.e. risks to either the environment or the health.255 
As such the provisions are all founded on a science-based approach, as national measures are to be 
based on new256 scientific evidence regarding these risks. The provisions also share that their 
respective substantive conditions have been interpreted strictly by the Commission, the EFSA and 
the EU Courts. This has been the case for the degree and existence of risk for Article 23 and Article 
34, as well as for the requirements on “new” evidence and specificity in Article 114.5 TFEU.  
 
It appears that the mentioned institutions stringently control the use of these provisions, and that 
divergent stances with regards to scientific uncertainty and varying views on existing data between 
Member States and the central institutions have been hard to accommodate. The Commission also 
relies heavily on the opinions of the EFSA in its decision-making.  
 
Indisputably, a significant evidential burden lies upon Member States that want to invoke measures 
under these articles. In the context of authorised GM crops, thus far, not a single Member State has 
successfully provided new scientific evidence showing risk to environment or human health under 
Article 23 or Article 34. The same goes for Article 114.5 TFEU in the very limited number of cases 
it has been invoked to restrict GMO cultivation, as the cumulative substantive conditions have been 
interpreted so stringently. 
 
However, in spite of the strict understandings of the substantive conditions and almost continual 
opposition from the Commission, several Member States have not hesitated to adopt restrictions on 
GM cultivation.  With regards to the only commercially cultivated GM crop, the MON810, six 
Member States currently have safeguard and emergency measures257 in place. Notwithstanding the 
Commission’s and EFSA’s constant opinions that Member States have not met the substantive 
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new element to the original risk assessment regarding the risk.  
257 Reminder: Austria, Hungary and Greece under Article 23 Deliberate Release Directive. Italy, Luxemburg and France 
under Article 34 FFR.  
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requirements in Article 23 and Article 34, the decision-making structure that accompany these 
provisions has permitted the same states to maintain them. The Commission has held that these 
measures, since they are not based on new or additional scientific information are not justified from 
a legal point of view.258Alternatively the Commission has not acted upon the notifications on the 
measures. Or as is the case for coexistence measures the Commission has deemed the measures to 
be too small to actually conflict with trade. As will be shown in chapter 4.3 such an approach to 
ceoxistence measures is questionable in light of the CJEU’s case law on the free movement.  
 
Thus, it can be concluded that in theory, the theoretical scope for Member States to derogate under 
these provisions is narrow.  However, procedural rules and a lax approach from the Commission in 
some cases has allowed for Member States to keep many restrictions although being legally 
questionable through not fulfilling the substantive conditions. This means that to a certain degree, 
the scope of the opt out possibilities is widened in practice, much against their intended use.   
 
The restrictions to the areas of environmental or human health protection mean that other concerns 
raised by GM cultivation are excluded under the safety provisions. As such, the legal possibilities to 
accommodate other national concerns post-authorisation under them  are basically non-existent if 
they are deemed to be concerns regarding health or the environment. This was evidenced by Land 
Oberösterreich where concerns about coexistence of organic agriculture and GM cultivation was 
deemed to be concerns of a socioeconomic character, thus falling outside the scope of Article 114.5. 
One could of course hold that the this is only valid with regards to the substantive requirements, as 
for instance the Comitology rules in practice allow for other (or any) considerations to uphold 
restrictions. 
 
Here coexistence measures under Article 26a has had and will have a role to play in terms of 
substance of the concerns, albeit also coming with limitations to their scope.  As such they allow for 
socioeconomic concerns to be used as reason that potentially restrict GM cultivation. The specific 
economical logic behind them and the fact that they are not intended to exclude GM cultivation, 
but rather facilitate harmonious coexistence between the three types of agriculture are important 
limitations. Furthermore, the general requirements on proportionality in the context of GM-free 
areas are also of great importance as will be shown further in 4.3. It is not certain that the 
Commission’s lax approach in this regard would be shared by the CJEU if a Member State’s 
extensive use of coexistence measures were challenged.  
 
Overall, the narrowness of the scope of these provisions and the fact that national derogation 
measures could be kept thanks to procedural rules instead of what was allowed on substantial 
grounds were two of the reasons why the Commission came to propose the new Article 26b in 
2010. We now turn to this new article to looks into the scope of it and see how it changes Member 
States’ overall scope to opt out of GM cultivation.  
                                                 
258 Commission, COM (2010) 380 final, p. 2f 
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4 The new Article 26b – what is key? 
In March 2015 the Council formally adopted Directive 2015/412 that amends the Deliberate 
Release Directive. Enshrined within it is Article 26b, which intends to extend the possibilities for 
Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of GMOs.259 The original derogation 
possibilities just examined will continue to exist after this amendment.  
 
Article 26b applies to GMOs authorised for cultivation purposed either under the Deliberate 
Release Directive or the FFR and offers two stages for Member States to opt out. One is offered 
during the (re-) authorisation procedure and requires consent from the applicant. The other 
possibility - like the original ones - is after the GMO has been authorised for cultivation. In that 
case a non-exhaustive  list of new derogation grounds are provided for the Member States to justify 
their measures on. However, the invoked grounds cannot conflict with the environmental risk 
assessment carried out under the Deliberate Release Directive or the FFR. In addition to the 
requirement that the measure is based one of the new grounds, the measure has to be in 
“conformity with Union law”.260  
 
With the previous chapters in mind, the legislative process regarding the article unsurprisingly 
turned out to be prolonged and challenging. The final text was welcomed by Commissioner 
Andriukaitis, who held that the agreed text gives Member States “the final say” on GM cultivation 
on their territory, allowing them “to better take into account their national context and, above all, 
the views of their citizens”.261 However, not all stakeholders were as satisfied with the outcome. 
Some has held that “it grants biotech companies the power to negotiate with elected governments 
and excludes the strongest legal argument to ban GM crops – evidence of environmental harm”.262 
Others hold that the real purpose of the new article “is to make it easier to wave through EU 
authorisations of GM crops” and that it is not a “legally-watertight basis” for opting out, but a 
Trojan horse “riddled with loopholes”.263  The biotech industry association EuropaBio, on the other 
hand called it “a stop sign for innovation in Europe”, enabling Member States to “reject safe EU 
approved products based on arbitrary and non-scientific reasons”,264 i.e. on grounds of concerns 
other than safety.  
 
In accordance with the second subquestion, this chapter seeks to examine the scope of the new 
possibilities that Article 26b offers for Member States to restrict GM cultivation and how this 
amendment affects the overall scope to opt out. First a brief overview of the bumpy legislative 
development is given, where the Commission’s original proposal is highlighted (4.1). This is 
followed by an examination of the content of the article itself, divided into the two different stages 
                                                 
259 Note that the provision is concerned only with restrictions and prohibitions on cultivation of GMOs. Measures under 
it cannot otherwise restrict the free circulation and import of GMOs as products or harvest from GM crops, Article 
26b.8 and Recital 16 Directive 2015/412 
260 Article 26b.3(1) Directive 2015/412. 
261 Commission, Statement/14/2363, 4 December 2014. 
262 Greenpeace, EU Parliament to adopt new GM crop national opt-out law: http://www.greenpeace.org/eu-unit/Global/eu-
unit/reports-briefings/2015/GMOs%20briefing%2012012015%20%20FINAL.pdf 
263 EurActiv, MEPs approve national ban on GM crops cultivation: http://www.euractiv.com/sections/agriculture-
food/meps-approve-national-ban-gm-crops-cultivation-311221  
264 EuropaBio, GMO Agreement: A Stop for Innovation: http://www.europabio.org/press/gmo-agreement-stop-sign-
innovation 
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of opting out (4.2). Lastly the possible limits to the scope of the article and the implications of that 
Member States’ measures are to be in conformity with Union law are examined (4.3). 
 
It is found that Article 26b might not increase Member States’ scope to adopt restrictive measures 
as much as it first appears. Opting out in the authorisation stage will depend on the outcome of 
negotiations with the biotech companies seeking authorisation. As for opting out post-authorisation 
the de-harmonisation entailed by the amendment allows for a very wide range of concerns to be 
invoked. However, environmental concerns still appear to be harmonised to a large extent. 
Furthermore the actual scope under the new derogation grounds will depend on the approaches and 
interpretations of the Commission and the CJEU of compatibility with rules governing the free 
movement of goods. In this regard, establishing genuineness and proportionality could pose real 
hurdles depending on the circumstances and conditions under which the measures are invoked.  
 
4.1 An overview of the legislative development 
By June 2009 Austria and twelve265 fellow Member States at opposite ends of the GMO debate,266 
came together and signed a declaration267 that urged the Commission to put forward a proposal for 
an amendment allowing for greater national autonomy as regards the cultivation of GM crops. Later 
that year, the then President of the Commission José Manuel Barroso addressed the issue in his 
political guidelines of the new Commission. He did so by referring to the principle of subsidiarity 
and stated that the GMO framework might not have been considerate enough of “the 
consequences of diversity in a EU of twenty-seven Member States”. Barroso’s view was that it 
should be possible to combine a science based EU authorisation system, with freedom for Member 
States to decide whether they wish to cultivate GM crops on their territory.268  
 
In mid 2010, the Commission put forward a GM cultivation reform package, including a proposal 
to amend the Deliberate Release Directive to implement the political guidelines.269.  
 
The overarching purpose of the Commission proposal was to, “in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity” grant the Member States more freedom to decide on GMO cultivation, “without 
changing the system of Union authorisations of GMOs”.270 In its explanatory memorandum several 
underlying motives behind the Commission’s proposal appear.  Regarding safeguard and emergency 
measures, it explicitly stated that the Member States’ limited margin of appreciation on cultivation 
of authorised GMOs had in many cases led them to act on the basis of non-scientific grounds.271 
Thus an amendment was “necessary to facilitate decision making and take into account all relevant 
                                                 
265 Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland and 
Slovenia.  
266 The group included GMO-sceptical Member States like Poland and Hungary, but also the Netherlands who has been 
more supportive of genetic engineering, Geelhoed 2014 p. 15.  However, Member States that are generally opposed to 
GM crop cultivation, such as France was not part. The latter has been described to have been concerned that that the 
reform would ”divert attention from the problems of the environmental risk assessment by the EFSA, as well as from 
the need to reform the EU authorisation procedure”, Weimer 2014, p. 35. 
267 COUNCIL, doc nr. 11226/2/09,  24 June 2009. 
268 José Manuel Barroso, Political guidelines for the next Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-
2014/president/pdf/press_20090903_en.pdf  
269  Commission, COM (2010) 375 final. The Commission simultaneously issued the new guidelines on coexistence 
measures, see chapter 3.3. 
270 Recital 6 Commission, COM (2010) 375 final. 
271 There is substance in this statement. However it also disregards divergent interpretations of science and estimations 
of acceptable risks. 
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factors”. 272  In addition, recourse to Article 114.5 on the basis of considerations other than health 
and environmental protection could be avoided. Hence, resort to the original opt out possibilities 
were expected to be reduced, and only be used in line with their intended purposes. As a result, the 
institutional burdens on the Commission and the EFSA could decrease.273  
 
Finally, this solution would provide for increased legal certainty for Member States wishing to 
restrict or prohibit cultivation of GM crops, and increase predictability of the decision-making 
process for affected stakeholders.274  
 
The proposal was held by some as being a “substantial policy turn” in comparison to previous 
Commissions policy on national restrictions on GMOs,275 and as such being a “pragmatic” 276 
compromise attempting also to remedy the delays of the authorisation procedure, allowing for more 
authorisations and reinforcing trade and the internal market.277 As Lee states, for the Commission a 
“divided market in GMOs might be a price to pay for cultivation in favourable Member States” 278 
of more GM varieties.    
 
While the functioning of the authorisation scheme is not really the main subject of the thesis, these 
are still some interesting observations, as they highlight that the Commission seems to have found a 
compromise necessary between getting more authorisations through and allowing for greater 
national autonomy with potential fragmentation of the internal market in GMOs as a consequence. 
Time will tell if GMOs will be approved faster given the new possibilities to opt out.  
 
In any case, the material content of the Commission’s proposed Article 26b was rather basic in 
comparison with the final product.  It stated that: 
 
Member States may adopt measures restricting or prohibiting the cultivation of all or particular 
GMOs authorised in accordance with Part C of this Directive or Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, 
and consisting of genetically modified varieties placed on the market in accordance with relevant 
EU legislation on the marketing of seed and plant propagating material, in all or part of their 
territory, provided that: 
 
(a) those measures are based on grounds other than those related to the assessment of the adverse 
effect on health and environment which might arise from the deliberate release or the placing on 
the market of GMOs; and, 
 
(b) that they are in conformity with the Treaties.279 
 
                                                 
272 Commission, COM (2010) 375 final, p. 3f.  
273 Ibid, p. 3f.  
274 Among the affected stakeholders GMO farmers, organic and conventional farmers, seed 
producers/exporters/importers and biotechnology companies are mentioned, see ibid, p. 4. 
275 Weimer 2010, p. 346. 
276 Weimer called the proposal pragmatic as it recognized that the EU authorisation regime, enforced against the 
opposition of a majority of Member States, cannot be sustainable in the long term. An additional pragmatic element was 
the hopes to avoid that in the future Member States continue to base their decision-making in the comitology on 
whatever concerns they have undermining the scientific authority of EFSA's risk assessments, ibid, p. 350ff. 
277 Poli 2010, p 339, 343; Weimer 2010, p. 346. 
278 Lee 2014, p. 235. 
279 Article 26b Commission, COM (2010) 375 final. 
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Notably, the “other grounds” that national measures could be based on were not specified. What 
was clearer was that restricting measures would have to be based on different grounds than those 
related to the risk assessment performed under the authorisation procedure.  
 
As will be shown below this proposal differs in several aspects from the final outcome. However, it 
laid the foundation for further discussions between the legislative institutions. The exact content of 
the new opt out clause came to be intensively debated within and between the different institutions. 
Before the time that the final version was agreed on in a political agreement between the EP and the 
Council in late 2014, the legislative development saw several compromise Council proposals under 
different presidencies.280 It also saw a two-year deadlock in the Council from 2012 to June 2014, 
where no agreement could be reached between the different government representatives.281 The 
deadlock did not end until the Commission proposed for a positive authorisation decision for 
cultivation of the GM maize Pioneer 1507. That seem to have sparked the change in attitude 
amongst enough ministers in the Council that was needed to reopen the discussions.282 
 
Several aspects of the content and implications regarding Article 26b were debated during the 
legislative procedure. The discussions concerned everything from the appropriate legal basis for the 
amendment to the form of it.283 Although more important for current purposes were discussions 
regarding some other features and implications of the amendment.  As is apparent from the 
Commission’s proposal it only included the possibility for Member States to opt out post-
authorisation. This is another aspect that was debated and it will be shown below how the final 
outcome provides additional possibilities for Member States. Also at the centre of the debates in the 
legislative process was the issue of derogation grounds for opting out. The outcome of these latter 
discussions will now be further examined as we turn to the content of the final version of Article 
26b. 
4.2 The outcome – two stages for opting out 
As stated above, the new Article 26b provides for two ways of opting out for a Member State that 
opposes cultivation of GM crops. First, this can be done against a given GMO during the 
authorisation procedure or during the renewal of an authorisation by a Member State demanding 
the applicant to adjusting its geographical scope of its application on a given GMO. Secondly, the 
Member State in question can rely on the grounds in a non-exhaustive list of derogation grounds to 
restrict or prohibit cultivation of a given GMO or a group of GMOs after authorisation. These two 
stages will now be examined closer. 
 
4.2.1 During authorisation – Article 26b.1-2 
Article 26b introduces a whole new way of restricting GM cultivation by allowing for Member 
States to opt out during the authorisation procedure. It is also “new” in that this first stage includes 
the economic operator in the process.  
                                                 
280 See e.g. the Danish and Greek Presidencies’ compromise proposals; COUNCIL, doc nr.  7153/12,  2 March 2012 
and COUNCIL, doc nr. 6528/14, 17 February 2014. 
281 A group of Member States, including France, the UK, Germany and Slovakia blocked a compromise as they had 
concerns regarding, in particular, the compatibility of WTO law and the EU internal market provisions. Poli 2013, p. 
147.  
282 Cf. Geelhoed 2014, p. 8. 
283 The Commission’s proposal suggested a regulation, but the final outcome was a directive. 
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The attentive reader sees that this new possibility was not provided for in the Commission’s 
proposal from 2010. Until 2012 the focus of the legislative debate had mainly focused on the 
different derogation grounds and not on how and when Member States might actually invoke them. 
Under the Danish Council Presidency in 2012, a compromise proposal was put on the table that 
envisioned a two-way opt out model. In addition to the right to restrict or prohibit cultivation after 
authorisation, the Danish proposal suggested an independent possibility to opt out from cultivation 
of a specific GMO during the authorisation procedure.284  
 
As for the adopted version, Article 26b.1 states that, during the authorisation procedure or during 
the renewal process a Member State may demand that the geographical scope of the authorisation 
of a given GMO is adjusted to the effect that all or part of its territory is to be excluded from 
cultivation from that crop.  Such a demand has to be communicated to the Commission within 45 
days, whereby the Commission is to present the demand to the applicant and to the other Member 
States.285 No motivations from the Member State seems to be necessary here, which means that 
whatever concerns the Member State might have regarding GM cultivation is valid.  
 
Upon this, the applicant has 30 days to either adjust - i.e. accept the demand - or confirm -i.e. reject 
the demand - the geographical scope of its initial application.286  
 
If the applicant decides to accept the Member State’s request, the adjustment of the geographical 
scope is to be implemented under the Deliberate Release Directive or the FFR depending on the 
scope of the application. As a result, cultivation in the whole or part of the Member State’s territory 
is excluded from the authorisation of the specific GMO.287 
 
However, the applicant has the option to decline adjusting the geographical scope of the 
application. In that case three possible scenarios can take place. First, the Member State that made 
the demand may simply accept the applicant’s stance. This seems rather unlikely given the historical 
persistence of Member States on the issue. Another possibility is that the Commission opposes the 
applicant’s confirmation of the original scope in accordance with its powers under the Deliberate 
Release and the FFR in light of the environmental risk assessment carried out by the EFSA.288 More 
likely however, the opt out process moves on to stage two, where the applicant is excluded from the 
procedure, but the Member State has to make use of one of the new derogation grounds.289  
 
A Member State that manages to get the economic operator to adjust its geographical scope may 
later wish to include all or parts of its territory into the scope of the authorisation from which it was 
first excluded. Such “reintegration” is expressly permitted and does not require the consent of the 
authorisation holder.290    
 
                                                 
284 COUNCIL, doc nr.  7153/12,  2 March 2012, p. 9f. 
285 This shall be done by the Commission ”without delay”. Furthermore the Commission shall make the demand 
publicly available by electronic means, Article 26b.1 Directive 2015/412. 
286 Article 26b.2(1) ibid. 
287 Article 26b.2(2) ibid. 
288 Article 19 Deliberate Release Directive, and Articles 7 and 19 FFR. See Recital 12 Directive 2015/412.  
289 Article 26b.3(1) Directive 2015/412. See 4.2.2.. 
290 Article 26b.5-6 and Recital 21 Directive 2015/412. 
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It is stated in the preambular text of Directive 2015/412 that it is expected that most restrictions or 
prohibitions adopted pursuant to the new article will be implanted at this stage.291 The Council 
stated that a solution of this kind is appropriate to ensure the least possible disturbance to the 
internal market while at the same time facilitating the authorisation process of GMOs. Furthermore 
it held that this stage one possibility is “likely to provide the greatest possible legal certainty” to 
operators as well as to Member States.292    
 
In reality, successful recourse to this stage-one opt out will be up to the outcome of negotiations 
between Member State representatives and negotiators from the biotechnology companies. As 
mentioned above, this state of affairs has been criticised, for granting biotech companies the power 
to negotiate with elected governments. However, the solution seems straightforward from a legal 
perspective. Greater legal questions await where agreements cannot be reached. 
4.2.2 Post-authorisation – Article 26b.3 
4.2.2.1 Introduction 
If no demand was made by the Member State to the applicant or if the applicant denied adjusting its 
geographical scope, the post-authorisation opt out stage starts.  
 
In that case, Article 26b.3 allows for Member States to adopt measures restricting or prohibiting the 
cultivation in all or part of its territory of a specific GMO or of a group of GMOs under the 
conditions that the measures adopted are based on “compelling grounds” and otherwise are “in 
conformity with Union law”.293 Before we venture into what these requirements mean, some initial 
remarks are in place..  
 
The provision allows for restrictive measures on “a GMO” or of a group of GMOs defined by 
“crop”294 or “trait”.295 Although being wider than what stage one opt out provides for, this seems to 
be a rather big limitation in comparison to the Commission’s proposal that allowed for measures on 
“all or particular GMOs”.296   
 
The procedural requirements regarding when a Member State may rely on post-authorisation 
measures have been quite disputed during the legislative procedure. Whereas the Danish model 
allowed for two ways out of cultivation that were “independent” from each other, the Greek 
Presidency proposed more stringent rules. The Greek proposal stated that restrictions after 
authorisation would only be available for those Member States that had unsuccessfully demanded 
that the applicant adjusted its geographical scope during the authorisation procedure.297 This 
limitation does not seem to be the case for the final version,298 and therefore any Member State 
seem to be able to use this possibility irrespective of previous negotiations with the economic 
operator.   
                                                 
291 Recital 13 ibid.  
292 COUNCIL doc nr. 10972/3/14 REV 3 ADD 1, 23 July 2014, p.3. 
293 Article 26b.3(1) Directive 2015/412. 
294 E.g. maize. 
295 E.g. herbicide-resistant crops. 
296 See Article 26b Commission, COM (2010) 375 final. In line with what is said in chapter 4.3 about proportionality the 
commission’s suggestion seems extreme in this regard. 
297 COUNCIL, doc nr. 6528/14, 17 February 2014.., p. 4. 
298 See the wording ”Where no demand was made pursuant to paragraph 1” in Article 26b.3(1) and the use of the 
wording ”in addition also be the possibility for Member States to adopt […] in Recital 13. Both in Directive 2015/412. 
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When a Member State intends to adopt measures under Article 26b.3 it first needs to communicate 
a draft of those measures to the Commission. That draft is to include the corresponding grounds 
that the Member State invokes as the basis for their measures. During a timeframe of 75 days after 
the communication to the Commission the Member State in question is not allowed to adopt and 
implement the restricting measures. Furthermore, the Member State shall ensure that no plantation 
of the GMO or GMOs concerned takes place within its territory in this time. The Commission may 
make any comments it considers appropriate on the draft during this period.299    
 
When the period of 75 days has expired, the measures may be adopted either in the form the 
Member State originally proposed or in a different form if it has taken account of the Commission’s 
non-binding comments. The restriction or prohibition time corresponds to the authorisation period 
of the GMO(s) in question.300 Thus, bans on cultivation under this new provision does not have the 
same provisional character as is intended for safeguard and emergency measures under the GMO 
legislation.301  
 
But what are the grounds that that can be invoked in the new article? We will now have a closer 
look at the outcome in this regard from the legislative process. This will also be compared to what 
the Commission envisioned as justifiable grounds, as this might give further understanding of their 
future use and acceptance on behalf of the EU’s executive body. Thereafter we turn to possible 
conflicts with the internal market rules when invoking measures under Article 26b.3.  
 
4.2.2.2 The new derogation grounds 
 
As mentioned above, measures may be adopted by Member States under Article 26b.3 given that 
they are based on “compelling grounds”.302 This is the first substantive limitation to the use of the 
new opt out clause.  
 
It was stated earlier that the Commission’s 2010 proposal did not specify what grounds Member 
States could rely on when restricting or prohibiting GMO cultivation under the article. Except for 
ruling out grounds related to the risk assessment carried out at the EU level during the authorisation 
procedure, the recital of the proposal vaguely explained that the “other grounds” were grounds 
relating to the “public interest”.303  
 
The vagueness in this regard came to be criticised in the beginning of the ordinary legislative 
procedure. For instance, the European Economic and Social Committee held that inclusion of 
specific derogation grounds would increase legal certainty for those concerned.304 In response, the 
                                                 
299 Article 26b.4(1) Directive 2015/412. 
300 Article 26b.4(2) ibid. 
301 As is the case for measures under Article 26b.1, Member States may revoke these bans. Revoked measures shall be 
notified to the Commission and the other Member States without delay, Article 26b.7 ibid.  
302 Article 26b.3(1) ibid. In addition Recital 16 states that conformity with the Treaties necessitates compatibility with 
216.2 TFEU. The latter means that measures cannot breach international agreements, such as those under WTO law. 
303 Recital 8 Commission, COM (2010) 375 final. Public interest is likely to refer the interests that can be pursued under 
Article 36 TFEU and the mandatory requirements. 
304 EESC, doc nr. NAT/480,  Para 1.2.  
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Commission soon provided for an open list of legitimate grounds relating to the public interest in 
order to satisfy the co-legislators. On the whole, these grounds are quite similar to the ones that 
were finally explicitly incorporated into the final text.  
 
In line with the above, the now adopted Article 26b states that measures that Member States adopt 
have to be based on “compelling grounds such as” the following:  
 
(a) environmental policy objectives; 
(b) town and country planning; 
(c) land use; 
(d) socioeconomic impacts; 
(e) avoidance of GMO presence in other products without prejudice to Article 26a; 
(f) agricultural policy objectives; 
(g) public policy.305 
 
The use of the wording “such as” emphasises that this is a non-exhaustive list of grounds that may 
be invoked by the Member States and the recitals also hold that “other legitimate factors” may be 
relied on.306  These grounds may be invoked individually or in combination depending on the 
particular circumstances of the Member State, region or area in which the measures will apply. One 
exception is “public policy”, which cannot be invoked separately.307  
 
Similarly to the Commission’s version the adopted article makes holds that the invoked grounds 
“shall, in no case, conflict with the environmental risk assessment” carried out pursuant to the 
Deliberate Release Directive or to the FFR.308  This is another substantial limitation of the article.309 
 
We now turn to have a look at what the legislators have envisioned as being the new derogation 
grounds, before we start at looking their possible limitations. 
 
4.2.2.2.1 “Environmental policy objectives” 
The new article states that Member States can rely on environmental policy objectives when 
adopting its cultivation bans. It also came to be included in the Commission’s indicative list,310 
possibly to increase the chances for final approval. As mentioned the article also states that the 
grounds invoked are not to conflict with the environmental risk assessment performed under the 
GMO legislative framework. This is so with regards to all derogation grounds, but in reality it 
should mostly be relevant with regards to this ground as the EFSA only has the competence to 
consider environmental (and health) impacts in its assessment of risks. 
 
The recitals of Directive 2015/412 hold that the level of protection of human and animal health and 
the environment chosen in the EU allows for a “uniform scientific assessment throughout the 
Union” and that the amendment should not alter this.311 Further, they state that the certain 
competences granted to risk assessors, i.e. the EFSA and risk managers under the Deliberate 
                                                 
305 Article 26b.3(1) Directive 2015/412. 
306 Recital 15 ibid. 
307 Article 26b.3(2) ibid. 
308 Article 26b.3(2) ibid.  
309 See chapter 4.3.1. 
310 Commission, SEC (2011) 184 final,, p. 3.  
311 Recital 14 Directive 2015/412. 
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Release Directive and the FFR are not to be “interfered with”.312  The recitals further hold that 
Member States may only rely on grounds with respect to environmental policy objectives relating to 
impacts that are “distinct from and complementary to the assessment of risks to health and the 
environment which are assessed in the context of the authorisation procedure”.313  
 
Distinct and complementary grounds in this regard are exemplified with maintenance and 
development of agricultural practices “which offer greater potential to reconcile production with 
ecosystem sustainability”. Maintenance of local biodiversity is also mentioned. This is suggested to 
include maintenance of “certain” habitats, ecosystems, or certain types of natural and landscape 
features, in addition to “specific” ecosystem functions and services.314  The Commission clarified 
these examples in its 2011 indicative list by stating that maintenance of certain habitats and 
ecosystems means “preservation of the conservation status quo”. Moreover, it specified the 
meaning of maintenance of specific ecosystem functions and services.  This could for example 
entail “preservation of nature-oriented regions of particular natural and recreational value to 
citizens”.315  
 
We return to questions of the scope to rely on environmental policy objectives in 4.2.2.3, where it is 
questioned if the inclusion of this ground is meaningful at all. 
4.2.2.2.2 “Town and country planning” and “land use” 
 
Other justification grounds that Member States may rely on according to the article are town and 
country planning and land use.316 The meanings of these grounds are not clarified anywhere in the 
directive, although they were included by the Commission in its indicative list in 2011. Some 
examples were given in that list that might give some indications on their intended use, at least in 
the eyes of the Commission. For example, as for general environmental policy objectives, 
maintenance of certain types of natural and landscape features can by justified under the these 
grounds “depending on the circumstances”.317 What these circumstances are is not elaborated with 
further by the Commission and remains unclear.  
 
In addition preservation of organic and conventional farming systems is suggested to fall in under 
this category.318 It is not clear in the indicative list if the latter should be achieved only by designing 
a restrictive national measure so as to avoid GMO presence in the crops in these farming systems. If 
so, that specific ground is already covered by 26b.3(1)(e), as it concerns the impossibility to achieve 
coexistence of the three agricultural types in a given area.319 However, it could also mean that 
preservation is envisioned for reasons other than the economic implications of farmers from 
adventitious admixture. 
                                                 
312 Recital 14 Directive 2015/412. 
313 Ibid.   
314 Ibid.  
315 Commission, SEC (2011) 184 final, p. 3. 
316 Article 26b.3(1)(b)-(c) Directive 2015/412. 
317 Commission, SEC (2011) 184 final, p. 3. 
318 Ibid. 
319 Ibid, especially footnotes 7 and 8; Poli 2013, p. 150 is of this opinion, and rules out the necessity of this ground since 
it is already covered.   
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4.2.2.2.3 “Socioeconomic impacts” and “avoidance of GMO presence in 
other products without prejudice to Article 26a” 
 
Other explicit legitimate concerns embedded in the article are “socioeconomic impacts”320 and 
“avoidance of GMO presence in other products without prejudice to Article 26a”.321 The latter is 
concerned with insufficiencies of coexistence measures. However, separation of these two 
justification grounds is not obvious when looking at the recitals. 
 
Recital 15 holds that a Member State should be able to base its restrictive measures “on grounds 
concerning socioeconomic impacts which might arise from the cultivation of a GMO” on its 
territory. These socioeconomic grounds may be related to the “high cost, impracticability or 
impossibility of implementing coexistence measures”. The impracticability or impossibility to 
implement coexistence measures might be attributed to specific “geographical conditions, such as 
small islands or mountain zones, or the need to avoid GMO presence in other products such as 
specific or particular products”.322 
 
In this context the recital text recognises that coexistence measures have been addressed by the 
Commission in its guidelines, but that there should be the additional possibility for Member States 
to adopt measures against cultivation of authorised GMOs through the amendment.323  The idea 
seems to be that Member States can implement restrictions relating to coexistence, but that these 
are not to be considered as coexistence measures under Article 26b.3 nor the Commission’s 2010 
coexistence guidelines. The inclusion of avoidance of GMO presence in other products is line with 
the Commission’s indicative list. In the list it was stated that restriction or prohibition measures may 
be justified under this ground when “other less restrictive measures are not sufficient to avoid the 
unintended presence of GMOs in other products”.324 How this relates to the concept of GM-free 
areas under Article 26a is not straightforward as such areas are to be established under the same 
circumstances. 
 
The recital states that these socioeconomic impacts “may” be related to the troubles adopting 
coexistence measures. This suggests that the Council and the EP has envisioned other aspects to fall 
in under this potentially broad derogation ground. At the moment it is not entirely clear what these 
other socioeconomic impacts could be, although a reference is made in the recitals to a forthcoming 
report from the Commission on such impacts.325 Notably, a separate category with “socioeconomic 
impacts” was not in the Commission’s indicative list. 
4.2.2.2.4 “Agricultural policy objectives” 
Furthermore measures could be based on grounds relating to “agricultural policy objectives”.326 This 
was not explicitly included among the grounds in the Commission’s indicative list but was added 
later in the legislative process. An indication of what this may include is “the need to protect the 
diversity of agricultural production and the need to ensure seed and plant propagating material 
                                                 
320 Article 26b.3(1)(d) Directive 2015/412. 
321 Article 26b.3(1)(e) ibid. 
322 Recital 15 ibid.  
323 Ibid. 
324 Commission, SEC (2011) 184 final, p. 3, especially footnote 6. 
325 Recital 15 Directive 2015/412. 
326 Article 26b.3(1)(f) ibid. 
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purity”.327 This exemplification also suggest a relationship to the concept of coexistence, although 
other agricultural policy objectives might be possible to pursue. 
 
4.2.2.2.5 “Public policy” 
The last of the derogation grounds that are included in Article 26b itself is “public policy”.328 This 
ground has to be invoked in combination with another compelling ground.329 Public policy is thus 
listed as a secondary ground. This differs from the CJEU’s general stance towards public policy as 
an explicit justification under Article 36 TFEU that can be used on its own terms.330  
 
What public policy entails in this context is not made clear by Directive 2015/412. In general it has 
been interpreted by the CJEU as to do with protecting the machinery of government, rather than 
underlying public values that the government seeks to serve. As such it can justify measures against 
dangers of civil disturbances.331  In relation to this, the Commission’s legal considerations found 
that public order could be relied on for example “to avoid social unrest due to the destructions of 
GMOs affecting the public order of the country”.332  
4.2.2.2.6 “Other legitimate factors” 
Last but not least, the non-exhaustive character of Article 26b.3 allows for Member States to base 
their measures on other compelling concerns.  An example of such other legitimate factors includes 
those relating to safeguarding “cultural traditions”.333 The Commission has held that this could 
include preservation of societal traditions in terms of traditional farming methods and  
“preservation of cultural heritage” that is linked to “territorial production processes with particular 
characteristics”.334  
 
Apart from factors relating to cultural traditions “social policy objectives” have also been proposed 
by the Commission. An example of a national measure pursuing such objectives could be one that 
seeks to keep a certain type of rural development in a given area to maintain occupational levels.335  
 
Last but not least, “public morals” was previously suggested by the Commission, but not included 
in the Directive 2015/412. The indicative list held that this includes “religious, philosophical and 
ethical concerns”.336 
4.2.2.2.7 Preliminary conclusions on the new derogation grounds 
 
This has been an overview of what the new derogation grounds entail, seen through what was 
included in Article 26b.3 and what the Commission has envisioned.  
 
                                                 
327 Recital 15 Directive 2015/412. 
328 Article 26b.3(1)(g) ibid. 
329 Article 26b.3(2) ibid. 
330 Geelhoed 2014, p. 20.  
331 See ibid, p. 19 with reference to Case 231/83 Cullet v Centre Leclerc. In this case the French Government failed to 
show that it was unable to meet the threat with the means at its disposal.  
332 Commission, SEC (2010) 1454 final, p. 9.  
333 Recital 15 Directive 2015/412. 
334 Commission,  SEC (2011) 184 final, p. 3. 
335 Ibid. 
336 Ibid, p. 2. 
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Several of the grounds, are either directly or indirectly concerned with the socioeconomic impacts 
of adventitious admixture of GM crops with non-GM ones. This includes Article 26b.3(b-f). As 
such they are concerned with problems adopting coexistence measures and preserving certain 
conventional and organic forms of agriculture. It should be reiterated that the impossibility to adopt 
coexistence measures to ensure farmers’ freedom of choice has been invoked by for example 
Austria to justify national restrictions.337 This inclusion seems to be a response to such concerns.  
 
Also other grounds such as ethical concerns and preservation of cultural traditions are included 
explicitly or have been envisioned by the Commission. Such concerns have also been invoked 
earlier.338  
 
Concerns regarding the environment is another common theme for Member States. In this regard it 
is unclear what the scope will be for Member States to rely on environmental policy objectives that 
do not conflict with the EU level environmental risk assessment. We turn to this issue next before 
we have a closer look at the legal significance of this non-exhaustive list of possible derogation 
grounds in light of the requirement that the national measures are to be “in conformity with Union 
law”. As will be shown, the real scope to rely on these new derogation grounds to restrict GM 
cultivation might not be as big in reality.  
4.3 The limits of Article 26b.3 
4.3.1 The limits of “environmental policy objectives” 
It was stated above that the “common consensus” is that the legislation on GMOs has provided 
exhaustive harmonisation when it comes to environmental protection and human health.339  
 
It appears clear from the inclusion of the restriction in Article 26b.3(2) and the preamble of the 
amending directive that with regards to environmental protection this will to a large extent still be 
the case. The question then becomes as to what extent the inclusion of “environmental policy 
objectives” is really meaningful, in the sense of extending Member States’ scope to derogate on 
grounds of environmental concerns? 
 
Where the exact line is drawn between such environmental concerns and those covered in the 
centralised risk assessment is hard to say. The interpretation of what amounts to “distinct” and 
“complementary” in this regard will be important.  
 
It is possible that the inclusion of “environmental policy objectives” might actually be rendered 
insignificant in light of that such objectives have to be distinct from those assessed under the EU’s 
risk assessment. For instance, Annex II of the Deliberate Release Directive requires that a 
comprehensive assessment is to be conducted, which includes the examples that have been 
provided in the recitals that are suggested to be “distinct”, such as “maintenance of habitats, 
ecosystems and landscapes”.340 Moreover, as regards local and regional impacts, the EFSA 
                                                 
337 See Commission Decision 2003/653/EC. It was rejected as a basis for derogation under Article 114(5) TFEU as a 
socioeconomic, rather than an environmental concern. See chapter 3. 
338 See chapter 4.3.3.2.  
339 Lee 2014 ,p. 237.  Hence the need to turn to the safeguard and emergency clauses or Article 114.5 TFEU. 
340 See Annex II para D and Annex III A, para III.B  Deliberate Release Directive, on which Geelhoed 2014 p. 22. 
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Guidelines already explicitly hold that such environmental characteristics are to be taken into 
account in the centralised risk assessment.341 
 
One could ask what amounts to already have been “assessed” in the context of the authorisation 
procedure? Is it only those aspects actually covered by the EFSA or is it also aspects that should 
have been covered, but were not? It is not sure if the EFSA’s failure to take “regional-specific” 
environmental characteristics into account, despite its formal commitment to do so, is a sufficient 
ground for national derogations here.342  
 
Even if it is accepted that regional environmental conditions can be invoked under Article 26b.3(a), 
the CJEU would have to decide whether this should offer more extensive opt out possibilities than 
those offered under Article 114.5. Here the high judicial thresholds set in the case law regarding for 
example the specificity requirement should be recalled.343 In addition, the requirements elaborated 
with in 4.3 will apply, which means that proportionality problems could arise with respect to 
geographically wide bans in Member States. This means that it is likely that only local bans can be 
pursued.344  
 
Thus it could be that Article 26b will not give Member States extended possibilities to invoke 
environmental grounds to restrict GM cultivation.345 Instead, Member States might still have to rely 
on the original science-based opt out possibilities, which were established to be very hard to use as a 
means to derogate. At least when it comes to fulfilling the substantive requirements. 
 
In any case, for those environmental policy objectives that fall outside of the harmonised scope, 
additional requirements will apply in order the be in conformity with Union Law. This in an issue 
we turn to next. 
 
4.3.2 The main limit – “Conformity with Union law” 
Apart from stating that national measures restricting GM cultivation are to be based on one or more 
“compelling grounds”, Article 26b also holds that the measures are to be “in conformity with Union 
law, reasoned, proportional and non-discriminatory”.346 Since secondary legislation cannot amend 
the Treaties, these restrictions would apply whether or not explicitly stated, as these conditions 
apply automatically in also in areas that are not harmonised,347 such as the now de-harmonised ones 
and those within the realms of coexistence. 
 
                                                 
341 See EFSA (1879) 2010, p. 24, on which Geelhoed 2014, p. 22. 
342 Geelhoed holds that this does not seem to be the case, ibid. Lee holds that it is arguable ”that because art 26b [of the 
Commission’s proposal] refers to the “assessment” of environment and health, anything not covered by the EFSA risk 
assessment could be revisited”, Lee 2013, p. 373f. 
343 Geelhoed 2014 p. 22. 
344 Larger areas of a Member States are unlikely to be entirely characterised by unique elements that demand preferential 
treatment.  Hence necessity and if required, proportionality in stricto sensu, will be hard to establish. See Geelhoed 
2014, p. 23 and similarly Poli 2013, p. 150. 
345 In fact Member States must proof that other concerns relied on are not invoked to conceal (harmonised) 
environmental aims. See below 4.3.2.2, especially Commission v Poland par 52-55. 
346 Article 26b.3(1) Directive 2015/412. In addition Recital 16 states that conformity with the Treaties necessitates 
compatibility with 216.2 TFEU. The latter means that measures cannot breach international agreements, such as those 
under WTO law. Compatibility with WTO law is outside the scope of this thesis. 
347 Lee 2014, p. 237. 
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As such the explicit inclusion of these restrictions in Article 26b.3 could be considered to merely 
serve as a reminder that even though Member States are granted more flexibility on their 
competence to restrict GMO cultivation, they are still bound by their legal obligations under general 
EU law. It is to be recalled that the Commission is only to be notified before the restrictions can 
take effect. This means that they can go on prohibiting cultivation of GM crops, but they might 
have to answer later before national and European courts when doing so.  
 
Whereas the likelihood of this happening is treated further below, the following discussions relate to 
possible legal implications if a Member State’s restrictions were to be challenged.  Indeed the 
Commission pointed out in its indicative list that “the sole invocation of one or several of [the 
derogations grounds] in abstract terms will not be sufficient to meet the scrutiny of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union”.348 As such, the national measure should be “carefully designed to 
withstand the Court scrutiny and not be contradictory”, whereby “substantive, persuasive and 
unequivocal evidence” is required.349  The Commission also underlined that only the CJEU is 
entitled to provide for the final interpretation of the article.350 
 
The implications of these restrictions on restrictive measures adopted under Article 26b.3 will be 
examined next. This is done in the light of the case law and doctrine on the internal market rules 
that are of relevance to the examined grounds in order to see what their actual legal scope might be. 
We start by looking at the relationship between the derogation grounds and the internal market 
provisions in the TFEU together with an introduction of the latter. 
 
4.3.2.1 Introduction – Article 34 and Article 36 TFEU 
 
It may be asked what the legal significance of the derogation grounds listed in Article 26b is? As 
evidenced by the reference to Article 2.2 TFEU,351 Directive 2015/412 explicitly de-harmonises 
issues that fall outside the EFSA’s risk assessment, which now allows for Member States to rely on 
derogation grounds such as the ones examined above.352 As such, there is no obvious legal effect to 
this non-exhaustive list of grounds itself, as national measures in any event have to comply with the 
Treaties.353 The meaning that national measures must be based on “compelling grounds”, is thus to 
be understood in relation to the EU rules on the internal market. In this regard the free movement 
provisions are the most relevant, namely Article 34 and 36 TFEU.354 
 
In the internal market “goods”, like those derived from biotechnology, are entitled free movement, 
one of the fundamental freedoms in Union law.355 Article 34 TFEU forbids quantitative restrictions 
on imports and measures having equivalent effect. The case law on this provision has clarified that 
all measures enacted by Member States which are “capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, 
actually or potentially” the trade in the EU are to be considered as measures having an equivalent 
                                                 
348 Commission, SEC (2011) 184 final, p. 3.  
349 Commission, SEC (2010) 1454 final, p. 10.  
350 Commission, SEC (2011) 184 final, p. 3. 
351 Recital 6 Directive 2015/412. Article 2.2 TFEU holds that Member States ”shall again exercise their competence to 
the extent that the Union had decided to cease exercising its competence”.  
352 It is possible that issues other than environment and health were never harmonised at all, so that Article 36 and 
mandatory requirements applied in any event, Lee 2014, p. 237. 
353 Lee 2014, p. 238. The article does not give Member States an enforceable right to ban GMOs. Instead it reallocates 
competences in this regard, see Geelhoed 2014 p. 16f. 
354 See Weimer 2010, p. 347. 
355 See chapter 2.2. 
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effect to quantitative restrictions.356   It is not at all unlikely that national restrictions or complete 
bans on cultivation would have considerable restricting effects on consumer behaviour regarding 
the use of GM seeds. On the contrary, demand of such seeds would likely completely disappear in 
the whole or part of the affected territory in that Member State among farmers who are potentially 
interested in GM cultivation. Hence, a cultivation ban may fall within Article 34 as a “measure 
having equivalent effect”, which has also been noted by the Commission.357  
 
In order to justify measures having equivalent effect, Member States can only rely on the derogation 
grounds provided for in Article 36 TFEU,358 or the mandatory requirements as established by the 
EU Courts’ case law.359 In that sense the grounds explicit in Article 26b.3 mirrors these available 
justifications to restrict trade.360  
 
The case law from the EU Courts shows that a wide range of social and ethical objectives has 
historically been relied on successfully by Member States outside the context of GMOs.361 However, 
within the context of GMOs the outcome might be different. In addition, research points to 
increasing reluctance from the courts to accept justifications for internal market derogations.362  
 
A first potential hurdle in this regard is establishing genuineness. According to settled case law from 
the CJEU, Member States bare the burden of showing that the conditions permitting derogation 
from Article 34 TFEU are satisfied.363 When a Member State relies in its defence on a legitimate 
aim, the Court is required to examine if the restrictive national legislation concerned does in fact 
pursue the purposes that the defendant Member State attributes to it.364 Put differently, the Court 
examines if the Member State genuinely seeks to pursue the interest it claims it does. In establishing 
genuineness of the Member State’s motivation a consistent approach to the specific issue in 
question is important.365  
 
Establishing the pursuit of a legitimate objective might not be the only problem for Member States 
when justifying their future GM cultivation restrictions. As is explicit from Article 26b and Article 
                                                 
356 Case C-8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoit and Gustave Dassonville, para 5. 
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36 TFEU366 national measures may not constitute arbitrary discrimination or disguised restrictions 
on trade between Member States.  However, the Court has not systematically addressed the 
question of what amounts to a disguised restriction or an arbitrary discrimination. It is even 
debatable, in light of the requirement of proportionality367 whether these requirements add anything 
at all to the Courts’ scrutiny.368  As such establishing proportionality might be the second significant 
hurdle for restricting GM cultivation under the new article. 
 
The principle of proportionality has been imposed as a requirement on trade restrictive measures by 
the EU Courts from an early stage.369 The principle is often said to hold that a measure must be 
suitable or effective and necessary to achieve the legitimate aim pursued by it.370 The former means 
that the Member State will be required to establish a link between the restrictive measure and the 
objective pursued. The latter holds that the Member State needs to establish that it is the least trade 
restrictive measure available to achieve this aim.371 In addition, some argue that a third criterion 
applies to the proportionality test, namely proportionality in stricto sensu.372 This means that a 
measure taken to protect one of the legitimate interests may be deemed unlawful if its contribution 
to the protective aim is too little in the light of its restrictive effect on trade. This view of 
proportionality implies that the interests named in Article 36 should be balanced against the free 
movement of goods,373 and individual rights, such as those of producers, consumers and farmers 
supporting GMO cultivation.374 
 
The precise content and stringency of proportionality in internal market law is not straightforward, 
in the sense that the EU Courts’ approach to it can vary,375 although in general the they have applied 
the so called necessity test restrictively.376 Furthermore, Member States have a margin of 
appreciation as for the level of protection they wish to achieve in de-harmonised areas for the aim 
they are pursuing. This is so even when other Member States have less strict measures in place.377 
The higher the level, the more intervening the measure may be and still be proportionate.378  
 
The question of course rises to what extent restrictive measures on GM cultivation under Article 
26b.3 might run counter to these principles of the internal market? We will now have a look at what 
the case law shows on Member States’ reliance on objectives such as the ones proposed by the 
Commission and finally included in the new article. In doing so we will have a closer look at public 
morality and the socioeconomic grounds.  Even though these do not represent the full range of the 
                                                 
366 This is the case also for mandatory requirements, Jans and Vedder 2012, p. 272. 
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possible derogation grounds, they illustrate some general and potential difficulties when it comes to 
justifying restrictions on trade in the EU. 
 
4.3.2.2 The example of public morality  
 
As stated above, public morality is not explicitly included in Article 26b.3. However, the 
Commission’s indicative list included it and held that this includes “religious, philosophical and 
ethical concerns”.379 For some countries, like Poland, the ethical and religious concerns raised by 
GMOs are particularly manifested. There is plenty of case law with regards to public morality and 
public policy under Article 36 TFEU outside the context of GMOs. The EU Courts have been 
ready to accept protection of public morals in some cases, although qualitatively very different from 
GMO cultivation.380 These cases have however been held to be “exceptional cases” by 
commentators.381 As will be shown below, case law in the context of GMOs show that relying on 
ethical grounds could be difficult for Member States when seeking to opt out from GM cultivation.  
 
In Commission v Poland,382 Poland unsuccessfully tried to rely on ethical and religious grounds to 
justify a general national ban on placing GMOs on the market in their territory.  
 
After receiving a letter of formal notice from the Commission of an infringement of the GMO 
legislation, Poland referred to the fact that Polish general public had shown itself to be strongly 
opposed to GMOs. Poland also refereed to the need to respect its ethical principles, claiming that 
not respecting the Polish concerns would be unethical.383 Additionally, they submitted that the fact 
that the assemblies of the Polish administrative regions had recently adopted resolutions declaring 
that the Polish territory should be kept free of GM crops and GMOs, showed that the national 
provisions in dispute reflected public morality.384 
 
The Commission brought the case to the Court and submitted that the Polish measure was 
incompatible with the system of free circulation established by the Deliberate Release Directive as a 
whole, particularly Article 22 and 23 thereof.385 Poland then further clarified their ethical claims and 
held that the adoption of the ban “was inspired by the Christian and Humanist ethical principles 
adhered to by the majority of the Polish people”. In Poland’s view their “Christian conception of 
life” ran contrary to the manipulation and transformation of living organisms created by God, and 
as such this conception “urges respect for creation […] and harmony between Man and Nature”. 386   
 
Responding on this, the Commission held that Poland had not produced any evidence capable of 
establishing that it was truly inspired by these ethical and religious considerations when adopting its 
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restricting measure.387 Poland then emphasized that it was well known that, at the time of the vote 
on their contested measure, most Polish MEPs belonged to parties for which the Roman Catholic 
faith is a fundamental value. Hence, it was not at all surprising that they were truly inspired by 
Christian and Humanist values when adopting the ban.388  
 
The Court held that to the extent that the national provisions pursued ethical objectives, which were 
unrelated to the objectives which characterising the Deliberate Release Directive, i.e. the protection 
of the environment and of human health, they were outside the scope of the harmonisation and 
could in “some circumstances” be justified under Article 36 TFEU.389 
 
However, instead of venturing into when these circumstances are at hand, the Court held that 
Poland, on which the burden of proof lied, had failed to establish that the “true purpose” of their 
ban was in fact to pursue the ethical and religious objectives that they held were relied upon.390 As 
such the “relevant evidentiary burden” was not discharged by presumptions of adherence to certain 
social values and statements as general as those put forward by Poland.391 
 
Therefore, the conclusion was drawn that public morality was not really being invoked as “a 
separate justification”, but as an aspect of the justification relating to the harmonised elements 
concerned with protection of human health and the environment.392 
 
In other words, Poland was unsuccessful in establishing that the true purpose of their measures 
were indeed ethical and religious objectives. It can be concluded from the case that the EU Courts 
will not simply accept any claims a Member State makes on that it is relying on public morality. 
More than sheer declarations that most of its population or legislators adhere to certain ethical and 
religious values are required to prove that public moral is genuinely pursued. Particularly, statements 
of a general nature will be hold to be insufficient. 
 
But it is not clear exactly what will be required in terms of proof in order the prove that an adopted 
restriction is indeed based on public morality or public interest in general. Would for example a 
referendum or some sort of large survey suffice showing factual existence of value-based concerns? 
Some sort of reliance on public participation expressing ethical concerns might be able to establish a 
genuine connection between the cultivation restriction and public morality. However, exactly what 
is required in terms of evidence is unclear.  
 
The question also arises to what extent a consistent approach to the claimed ethical concerns will 
matter in order establish genuineness of the Member State’s motivation. A problem of contradiction 
might arise if for instance GM products are otherwise allowed and consumed as food and feed in 
the Member State and their only objection is on GM cultivation.393 That could make it difficult to 
convince the EU Courts that ethical concerns genuinely lay at the root of a cultivation ban of a GM 
seed. 
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388 Ibid, para 41 
389 Ibid, para 50.  
390 Ibid, para 52. 
391 Ibid, para 54-59. 
392 Ibid, para 55. 
393 This issue was raised by the Council Legal Service, see Commission, SEC (2010) 1454 final, p. 9. 
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In this regard Poland is actually likely to be the most consistent Member State, as it has also 
attempted to ban the use of GMOs for animal feed.394  In contrast, France has argued on both sides 
of the GMO debate over the last decade.395 Although public morality is not a static notion, changes 
across fields and over time could make it difficult to demonstrate a sincere public morality objective 
for many Member States.   
 
Although the Court in Commission v Poland did not touch upon the issue of consistency, 
inconsistency has been the reason for Member States failing the Court’s scrutiny in relation to 
public morality in other cases.396  
 
As for proportionality, suitability is probably not that hard to establish.  However, necessity could 
be harder to demonstrate. For example, ethical concerns could be sheltered by labelling 
requirements of products derived from GM cultivation, which leaves moral choices to consumers. 
This is arguably less restrictive than a complete ban on GM cultivation itself.397 As the more 
extensive the restrictions are the harder it will be to claim that it is proportionate to the pursuit of 
ethical concerns, which means that it will be unlikely that nation-wide bans are accepted. With 
regards to the extent of the ban, a regional ban could also be easier to accept for the CJEU than a 
national one, as it could be somewhat more feasible to establish genuineness and consistency. 
 
Next up are some considerations on potential hurdles when invoking the various socioeconomic 
grounds included in Article 26b.3. 
 
4.3.2.3 The example of socioeconomic concerns 
 
As for the various socioeconomic concerns that are envisioned in Directive 2015/412 it has for 
long been established in the case law of the EU Courts that a Member State cannot rely on purely 
economic arguments to justify interference with free movement of goods.398  In this regard 
restrictions on the cultivation of GMOs enacted for economic purposes for example to avoid 
economic damage to conventional and organic farmers might be problematic, as they could be 
deemed to hinder free movement of goods for economic reasons.399   
 
As shown previously, the Commission itself has treated coexistence as being only about protecting 
farmers from economic losses.400 Moreover, the Commission has held that the relative size of the 
measures prevents them from hindering trade.401 By doing so it has in practice created something 
similar to a “de minimis-type exception”402 to Article 34 TFEU. However, in other cases the CJEU 
                                                 
394 The ban was the subject of Case C-313/11, Commission v Republic of Poland.  
395 This is of course a natural consequence of change of governments, which in turn is inherent to democracy. France 
has had a very wide range of field trials, but has also banned cultivation of MON810, see chapter 3.3. 
396 For instance in relation to gambling in Joined Cases C-316/07, C-358/07 to C-360/07, C-409/07 and C-410/07, 
Markus Stoβ and others v Land Baden-Wurttemberg, para 101. 
397 See Geelhoed 2014, p. 20, drawing an analogy with case law regarding proportionality and the objective of consumer 
protection. Case C-178/84, Commission v Federal Republic of Germany and Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein. 
398 See e.g. Case C-120/95, Nicolas Decker v Caisse de Maladie des employ           , para 39 and Case C-203/96, Chemische 
Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp BV and Others v Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, para 44. 
399 Cf., Poli 2013 p. 152.  
400 See chapter 3.3. 
401 Commission, SEC (2010) 1454 final, p. 11.  
402 Geelhoed 2014 p. 18. 
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has rejected such exceptions to the free movement of goods, even when the measures would only 
concern as little as 0,3 % of a Member State’s territory.403 This could mean that the Courts might 
not share the same view as the Commission, even when it comes territorially relative small 
restrictions. Hence, the restriction will indeed have to be justified.  
 
In such cases, it should be clarified that problems would only arise to the extent that a Member 
State fails to establish that it pursues something else than a purely economic purpose with its 
cultivation restriction. Alternatively, the CJEU would have to create an exception to the rule of non-
reliance on purely economic objectives. 
 
With regard to more far-reaching bans than which in any case could not be considered to fall under 
de minimis exception, Member States will thus have to argue that their pursuit of “purely” 
economic objectives contributes to the achievement of other underlying, yet compelling non-
economical aims. As for measures explicitly concerning problems with coexistence measures 
Member States could try to link the contamination risk from GM cultivation to the social value of 
organic or small-scale farming practices. As for protection of organic farming such objectives could 
be that such farming also delivers important public goods such as rural development and animal 
welfare. 
 
In doing this the Member State could try to rely on a case regarding Austrian land ownership 
restrictions where aims like “preserving agricultural communities, [...] the sympathetic management 
of the country side as well as encouraging the reasonable use of land” were acknowledged as 
legitimate aims to impede on the free movement of capital.404 These aims could perhaps be 
categorised under the grounds of “socioeconomic impacts”, “agricultural policy objectives”, “land 
use” and “town and country planning” of Article 26b.3 of Directive 2015/412.  
 
When it comes to establishing the true purpose of the measure questions arises also here on how to 
establish this. Namely, what evidence is required and how consistent must the approach be to 
demonstrate that the measure really seeks to protect for example small-scale farming and the animal 
welfare that comes with it? Evidence in this regard could perhaps be long-term consistent support 
of small-scale farming and animal welfare, together with evidence on the economic impacts of 
GMOs showing the vulnerability of this particular approach to farming that it argues is valued 
nationally.405 With Commission v Poland in mind, sweeping arguments and presumptions are not 
sufficient. Needless to say, not all Member States will be able to show consistency for example in 
support of particular farming structures.406  
 
As regards proportionality it was mentioned above that necessity has been interpreted rather 
restrictively in general CJEU case law. In a preliminary reference regarding coexistence measures 
AG Bot held that under the special circumstances that technical measures do not suffice to ensure 
coexistence, it was not “inconceivable” that Article 26a of the Deliberate Release Directive could be 
interpreted as allowing Member States to prohibit GM cultivation in specific areas of its territory.407 
However, Bot pointed out that the principle of proportionality required that such a possibility 
                                                 
403 Case C-67/97, Criminal Proceeding against Ditlev Bluhme.. See also Joined Cases C- 177/82 and C-178/82, Criminal 
proceedings against Jan van de Haar and Kaveka de Meern BV, para 14.  
404 Case C-452/01, Margarethe Ospelt and Schlössle Weissenberg Familienstiftung, para 39.  
405 Cf., Lee 2014, p. 241f. 
406 Austria could provide one example of a Member State that could be able to do so.  
407 Opinion of AG Bot – Case C-36/11, para 61. 
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would be “subject to the provision of strict proof” that less stringent measures would not suffice.408 
It is not unbelievable that such an approach would be adopted by the CJEU in the context of 
Article 26b.3.  If that was the case, technical measures might still have to do rather than actual GM-
free areas and smaller GM-free areas instead of larger ones where these suffice. 
 
It has been argued that the necessity test might give different results depending on the dominant 
forms of agricultural structures in the Member States. Necessity of restrictions might be easier to 
establish to prevent contamination in Member States like Poland and Austria where agriculture is 
dominated by small-scale or organic farming, than it is for Member States like Germany and 
Hungary that have transitioned to large-scale conventional farming Germany and Hungary.409  This 
could be so since it is easier to connect restrictions to the former structures of “quality” produce 
and farming to economical losses for such farmers and additional legitimate objectives than for 
conventional farmers, as the latter do not run the same risks from GM agriculture.  
 
In any case it would be hard to establish the necessity of national-wide bans. Local or regional ones 
are more likely to survive a scrutiny from the Courts.  
 
As regards specifically the ground relating to the inability to enact coexistence measures it should be 
noted that an absolute reliance on this ground would lead to the imperialism of conventional 
/organic agriculture over GM agriculture. As this situation would be contrary to the idea of 
coexistence between the three forms of agriculture, it is likely that opting out on the basis of that or 
similar considerations could come to be interpreted strictly.  
 
As such there is no guarantee of succeeding in convincing the CJEU of the legality of restrictions 
on socioeconomic grounds. Earlier case law on social values has indeed condemned national 
measures because of their impact on treaty economic freedoms.410  
 
We now move on to some concluding remarks as to the scope of Article 26b and its effect on the 
overall opt out possibilities. 
4.4 Concluding remarks on Aricle 26b 
This chapter has sought to scrutinize the scope to restrict GM cultivation under the new Article 26b 
and see how it changes the overall possibilities for Member States to do so. Following the exposé 
above it is not easy to give a straightforward answer to these questions. As is common among 
(soon-to-be) lawyers, the answer is, “it depends”. In fact, it depends on a number of factors. Will 
Member States succeed in negotiations with biotech companies to adjust the geographical scope 
during authorisation? If not, will measures adopted under Article 26b.3 be challenged? If they are 
challenged, how will they be motivated and how will the scope be interpreted by the CJEU in the 
context of the rules on free movement? Time will tell how exactly how these issues will settle, but 
some considerations and conclusions are provided already now.  
 
                                                 
408 Ibid.. Note that the CJEU did not rule on the proportionality of the Italian measure in the case as it was a preliminary 
reference, and left to the national court to decide on. 
409 See Geelhoed 2014, p. 19 and Dobbs 2010 p. 1363ff. 
410 Drawing on Lee 2014, p. 243 with reference to cases C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish 
Seamen’s Union v Viking Line  and Case C-341/05, Laval un Parneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet.  
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The amendment sets out a legal context for GM cultivation that clearly departs from some of the 
fundamental principles of the GMO framework. First, Member States may introduce restrictions 
before authorisations to cultivate GM crops is granted. Since this does not require explicit 
motivations nor approval at EU level this offers great potential to opt out of cultivation as nation-
wide bans could be introduced for the GMO in question following a mere notification to the 
Commission. This is very different from the original authorisation procedure as it does not require 
reaching a qualified majority with other Member States.411 Instead “simply” an agreement with the 
applicant is required.  The legislators seem confident or at least hopeful in that this is how most 
restrictions will materialise in the future.412 I must say that it is quite innovative by EU 
parliamentarians and the ministers in the Council to include this possibility since it does not come 
with any future legal concerns and provides for legal certainty. As such, it could be understood as a 
novel and consensus-oriented way to avoid impeding the freedom of free movement of goods 
provision.  Yet its success depends on the extent that biotech companies are willing to agree to the 
requests made by Member States. This represents a possible hurdle in itself.413 In any case, this 
shows again that procedural rules are important regarding national autonomy on GMOs.  
 
The second fundamental change is the partial de-harmonisation or re-nationalisation that comes 
with the amendment. Where the applicant rejects an adjustment of the geographical scope the 
Member States can now rely on a number of new derogation grounds in order to restrict cultivation 
post-authorisation. This shift allows for restrictive measures on cultivation to be handled as a matter 
of national competence, as if they were adopted before harmonisation. In essence this has the “de 
facto effect of narrowing down the scope ratione materiae” of the EU GMO regime.414 This is in 
sharp contrast to the original state of affairs where the reasons that could be invoked to justify 
restrictive measures were strongly constrained, 415 and predominantly subject to a science-based risk 
approach.  
 
However, as shown above, Article 26b.3 comes with some possible limitations. One concerns the 
extent that environmental policy objectives can be invoked. Others concern the possible hurdles 
identified in light of the (general) requirement of Union law conformity. 
 
As for the environmental aspects there are some serious doubts as to if the inclusion of 
“environmental policy objectives” adds anything at all in light of that the grounds invoked cannot 
conflict with the central risk assessment. The Commission did not originally envision environmental 
policy objectives as a derogation ground. It’s concise version of the then proposed Article 26b 
rather implied a clear division of responsibility where the risk assessment stays with the EU, whilst 
other (legitimate) factors to rely on go to the Member States.416  
 
Notably this goes against some Member States’ view of the impossibility for the EFSA to analyse 
the whole range of impact on the different national ecosystems. In the legislative process on the 
new article Member States such as France - that are mainly concerned about the environmental 
impacts of GMOs - were anxious to get a change in this regard as they are generally dissatisfied with 
                                                 
411 Which they have thus far always failed to reach. See chapter 2.  
412 See Recital 13 Directive 2015/412. 
413 As stated in 4.1., for some this is a moral hurdle.  
414 Poli 2010, p. 339.  Ratione materiae means subject matter. 
415 At least explicitly, as evidenced by Commission v Poland, where ethical concerns were not ruled out to fall outside of 
the harmonised parts of the GMO regime.  
416 See chapter 4.1. 
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the EFSA’s risk assessments and the authorisation procedure as a whole.417 However, the 
Commission and the Council majority418 have throughout the legislative process been of the view 
that such grounds may not conflict with the risk assessment conducted by the EFSA. In the eyes of 
the Commission the risk assessment already takes into account the adverse effects in health and the 
environment throughout the Union. The Commission apparently does not want the Member States’ 
new derogation possibilities to undermine the EFSA’s authority. This fact seems to haven been 
agreed on by the majorities of the Council and the EP, as a compromise to get the other derogation 
grounds.  
 
Overall it is likely that the assessments in the authorisation procedure and the original opt-out 
clauses will have to suffice with regards to risks to health and the environment. Whereas the original 
derogation possibilities themselves remain unaffected, the new article does not seem to change the 
issues of diversity of scientific interpretations and disagreement over different valuation of 
environmental risk between Member States, the EFSA and the Commission  However, in order to 
address conflicting views on how to deal with the scientific uncertainty surrounding long-term 
environmental impacts of GMOs and take more account of local-/regions specific environmental 
and health aspects, it seems that a modification of the harmonised risk assessment would be 
required.  Until this is done, it could be that conflicts regarding the safety aspects of GM cultivation 
will remain. 
 
If environmental policy objectives may at all fall outside the harmonised scope, measures invoked 
under that ground, or any other of the new ones, are subject to further concerns.  
 
As for the limitations imposed by conformity with Union law and its general principles and free 
movement obligations it is clear that Member States are not afforded a carte blanche with regards to 
post-authorisation restrictions. On the contrary, as suggested by the case law, establishing 
genuineness and proportionality might be difficult for Member States. I say, “might“, because we 
are on an unexplored and unpaved path here.  
 
Whereas decisions to restrict cannot be adopted immediately by Member States, they are not bound 
by the Commission’s opinion and can enact them in due time. However, in theory, national 
measures under Article 26b.3 could be subject to an infringement procedure brought by the 
Commission or proceedings brought by the GMO producer in national courts.419 Considering the 
Commission’s occassional lack of action on GM cultivation derogations and that it is keen on 
getting the authorisation procedure to function better, it is possible that the Commission will not 
confront Member States’ measures legally. Besides it is not sure that the Commission will enforce 
Union law in an area where the EU institutions has just (partially) renounced to exercise their 
powers in. In light of this it could be politically very difficult to plead before the Union Courts that 
a restriction is disproportionate.  
 
In any case, it is completely possible that the CJEU will eventually be requested to determine EU 
law conformity of a Member State’s measures adopted under the article. The approach from the 
courts regarding compatibility with Union law will be crucial for determining the actual scope under 
Article 26b.3. 
                                                 
417 Weimer 2014, p. 35. 
418 See for example Danish Presidency’s compromise proposal,  COUNCIL, doc nr.  7153/12,  2 March 2012. 
419 The former under Article 258 TFEU and the latter under Article 267 TFEU. Possibly also under Article 263(4) 
TFEU.  
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In general it could be said that we know that the outcome of a possible judicial procedure before 
the CJEU will depend on the circumstances of the individual case, particularly how the Member 
State chooses to justify  its measures and the restrictiveness of it and what evidence is provides.. 
 
 Whichever objective is presented as the basis for the cultivation restrictions, it must be clear that it 
is the actual reason behind the restriction, and that it is not concealing other illegitimate objectives, 
such as environmental or health concerns falling under the scope of the EFSA or purely economical 
ones. This will prove even more difficult to establish where national approaches are inconsistent. As 
such, genuineness could limit what derogation grounds that can be relied on successfully by 
different Member States.  
 
In addition, in light of proportionality, I find it hard to see that any absolute measures like nation-
wide cultivation bans will pass the test of Union law conformity. Rather smaller regional or local 
bans are likely to be accepted. 
 
To the optimistic reader the new derogation grounds could be seen as granting Member States 
significant flexibility, respect for national and local differences and an acknowledgement of the 
validity of concerns other than those related to safety. A sceptical reading, however, might render 
questions about the real intentions of the Commission. Whereas measures invoked under Article 
26b.3 are probably capable of interpretations that are compatible with general Union law, too 
narrow interpretation will render the article less significant from the perspectives of Member States 
that are sceptical to GM cultivation. In that case one might wonder if the Commission’s proposal 
was just a “cynical attempt to hasten authorisations, in confident expectation that any autonomy will 
be meaningless in practice”.420 While research points to increasing reluctance from the CJECU to 
accept justifications for internal market derogations, time will tell if it will show more lenience 
towards Member States’ non-scientific objectives against the backdrop of apparent explicit EU 
approval in Article 26b. 
 
Together this allows for questioning Commissioner Andriukaitis’ complacent attitude to Member 
States’ scope for action under the article, where he held that Member States would have “the final 
say” on GM cultivation on their territory. As biotech industry has the final say in stage one opt outs 
and the CJEU has the final say as for the stage two ditto this statement is utterly wrong.  
 
Drawing on this, it is also not clear if Article 26b will come along with the Commission’s hoped for 
benefits. Whereas the original regime was undoubtedly underperforming it is not sure that the 
article will aid decision-making on GMOs at the EU level. As many questions remain open as for 
the possible interpretation of measures under Article 26b.3 it is not sure that this solution provides 
for more legal certainty421 for involved stakeholders as the restrictions adopted under it could be 
legally vulnerable. 
 
                                                 
420 See Lee 2014, p. 243. 
421 The Commission declared this as one of its objectives for its proposal of Article 26b, see chapter 4.1. 
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5 Final considerations 
The thesis has sought to examine the scope for EU Member States to restrict commercial 
cultivation of GM crops within their territories. More specifically, it asked what the scope is for 
Member States to restrict cultivation of GM crops in response to the different concerns that this 
sort of cultivation raises. In order to answer that question the thesis looked into the scope and use 
of the original opt out provisions as well as the possible scope of the new Article 26b.     
 
As for the scope for Member States to respond restrictively to the variety of concerns accompanied 
by GM cultivation it could be concluded that none are easily or straightforwardly adhered to in the 
EU framework governing GMOs. Be they safety concerns, socioeconomic or ethical ones.  This is 
mainly so since this framework is part of a larger legal context where national autonomy will have to 
be measured against other demands, such as those of the internal market. In addition, the 
economical prospects of genetic engineering itself is something that has for a long time been 
emphasised, not least by the Commission.422 These are underlying aspects shaping the overall scope 
for Member State derogations. 
 
With specific regards to environmental concerns related to cultivation of GM crops the framework 
has been heavily centralised and new scientific evidence is a common denominator to allow for opt 
outs. It was concluded above that the new Article 26b is not likely to change the overall prospect 
for relying on environmental concerns. Instead, Member States with such concerns are likely to 
have to do with the very strictly interpreted original provisions in Article 23 of the Deliberate 
Release Directive, Article 34 FFR and Article 114.5 TFEU. A somewhat paradoxical consequence 
of the hardships in convincing the EFSA, the Commission and the CJEU that the substantive 
conditions are fulfilled could be that Member States that are worried about safety concerns will try 
to conceal these in terms of the now de-harmonised other legitimate objectives, hoping that those 
will be easier to pursue.  
 
It is however not sure how the (non-environmental) de-harmonisation that comes along with the 
amendment of Directive 2015/412 will change the actual possibilities to pursue other concerns such 
as socioeconomic and ethical ones. A number of hurdles have been identified stemming from 
fundamental rules and principles of the internal market, including establishing genuineness and 
proportionality. The future for national autonomy in this field very much depends on the approach 
taken by the central actors in the governance of GMOs. Now these will not only be the traditional 
ones such as the Commission and the EU courts. The number of actors has been extended to the 
biotech industry itself trough institutionalisation of negotiations with national governments, 
allowing in practice for any concerns to be adhered to. Following, however, the uncertainties 
surrounding future negotiations and interpretations  I dare not give a definite answer as to the 
question of Member States overall scope to opt out of GM cultivation. 
 
Indeed, uncertainty and paradoxes works in many ways in the context of GMOs. It is possible that 
allowing for more national autonomy could increase rather than decrease the EU market for 
                                                 
422 See chapter 2. 
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GMOs, as more GM crop varieties could be pushed through in the authorisation process.423 If, 
however, we see a stringent approach to the - on paper - newfound autonomy, an increase in 
authorisations is likely to only be a short-term effect. Instead, we might go back to the use of the 
original opt out possibilities where Member States find help from the comitology procedure to 
uphold national prohibitions and in practice can respond to concerns of any kind. Such seems to be 
the politics of GM cultivation. 
 
There appears to be no easy solutions in regulating GMOs in general, or GM cultivation specifically 
within the EU. At the very core of this massive institutional creation lay fundamental principles of 
multilateralism and free movement. Expanding the range of and finding room for objectives that 
can justify interruptions with free trade is indeed challenging in light of this. Allowing Member 
States to move forward under different policies, whatever they may be, could divide the EUs 
internal market and moves away from a cohesive approach. As representing the first case of de-
harmonisation,424 the German Chancellor Angela Merkel held the amendment to be “a first step at 
dismantling the [EU’s internal] market”.425 Such a view shows that questions of national autonomy 
and letting Member States respond to their citizens’ various concerns about GMOs is perhaps best 
understood in the context of the meaning of European integration. It then becomes more than a 
question of how to regulate GMOs or GM cultivation in itself. It becomes a matter of principle.  
 
Finding room for Member States to express the diverse concerns of their own citizens is almost 
bound to lead to situations where not everyone can be content. Too much insistence on EU 
authority could potentially undermine the perceived legitimacy of the EU institutions and the 
internal market if GMOs are pushed onto reluctant Member States. This makes too narrow 
interpretations on behalf of the Commission and the CJEU risky in the same way as a too lenient 
approach is for other fundamental values. Accepting simple claims of reliance on “public opinion” 
when introducing restrictive measures would give Member States a free hand to avoid their 
obligations under the Treaties when they feel like it. Such an approach would run contrary to 
decades of market integration and risks undermining one of the EU’s primary achievements. Whilst 
expanding the range of legitimate objectives that can justify interruptions to free trade has been 
difficult to agree on, so is the alternative with perceived illegitimacy of the legal framework and the 
EU itself. A consequence being that the law does not function as intended.426  
 
Whereas no definite answer can be given on the scope for Member States to opt out of GM 
cultivation I feel more confident in stating that the controversies surrounding this debated area of 
regulation will continue. Indeed authority on GMOs is likely to continue to be disputed and politics 
matter as much as law in this fascinating area of regulation.   
 
                                                 
423 That is regarding the number of GM varieties on the market and in cultivation. As for the effect that the new 
derogation possibilities will have on the total area of GM cultivation it is hard to speculate in light of the uncertainties 
explored above.  
424 On the explicit basis provided by Article 2.2 TFEU. 
425 EurActiv, EU governments seen opposing GM crop proposals: http://www.euractiv.com/cap/eu-governments-seen-
opposing-gm-news-496823. 
426 As evidenced by the use of the original opt out possibilities and that the authorisation GMOs for cultivation 
purposes has been filled with delays.   
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